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Abstract
This paper analyzes the joint dynamics of religious beliefs and scientic-economic develop-
ment. It emphasizes in particular how this coevolution is shaped by (and feeds back on)
political conicts and coalition formation, along both religious and income lines. As part of
our motivating evidence, we also uncover a new fact: in both international and cross-state U.S.
data, there is a signicant negative relationship between religiosity and innovativeness (patents
per capita), even after controlling for the standard empirical determinants of the latter.
To shed light on the workings of the science-religion-politics nexus and its growth and dis-
tributional implications, the paper develops a model with three key features: (i) the recurrent
arrival of scientic discoveries which, if widely di¤used and implemented, generate productivity
gains but sometimes also erode existing religious beliefs (a source of utility for some agents)
by contradicting important aspects of the doctrine; (ii) a government that can allow such
ideas and innovations to spread, or spend resources to censor them and impede their di¤usion;
(iii) a religious organization or sector (Church or churches) that can, at a cost, undertake an
adaptation of the doctrine that renders it more compatible with the new knowledge.
The model leads to the emergence of three types of long-term outcomes. The rst is a
Secularizationor Western-Europeanregime, with declining religiosity, unimpeded scientic
progress, a passive Church and high levels of taxes and secular public spending. The second
is a Theocraticregime with knowledge stagnation, extreme religiosity, a Church that makes
no e¤ort to adapt since its beliefs are protected by the state, and also high taxes but now
used to subsidize the religious sector. In-between these two is a third, American regime,
which generally (not always) succeeds in combining unimpeded scientic progress and stable
religiosity within a range where the state does not block new discoveries and the religious sector
nds it worthwhile to invest in doctrinal repair and adaptation. This regime features lower
taxes than the other two, but with positive revenue or tax exemptions allocated to religious
activities. We also show that, in this Americanregime, a rise in income inequality can lead
the religious rich to form a religious-rightalliance with the religious poor and start blocking
belief-eroding discoveries and ideas. Inequality can thus be harmful to knowledge and growth,
by inducing obscurantist, anti-science attitudes and polices.
Keywords: science, discovery, innovation, technological progress, knowledge, economic growth,
religion, secularization, tolerance, religious right, theocracy, politics, blocking, Church, state,
inequality, redistribution.
JEL Classication: P16, H11, H26, H41, Z12
1 Introduction
For an economy to create the technical advances that enabled it to make the huge leap of modern
growth, it needed a culture of innovation, one in which new and sometimes radical ideas were respected
and encouraged, heterodoxy and contestability were valued, and novelty tested, compared, and di¤used
if found to be superior by some criteria to what was there before. (Mokyr, 2012, p. 39)
Throughout history there have been periodic clashes between scientic discoveries and
religious doctrines, and even today such conicts remain important in a number of countries.
In such cases the arbiter is often the state, which can allow the di¤usion of the new knowledge,
or on the contrary try to repress and contain it in order to protect religious beliefs. Its choice
depends in particular on whether its power base and class interest lies more with the secular
or religious segments of the population, and thus on the general level of religiosity as well as
the distribution of productive abilities among agents. There is therefore a two-way interaction
between the dynamics of scientic knowledge and those of religious beliefs, which evidence
suggests can lead to very di¤erent long-term outcomes across countries.
History and contemporary events o¤er many examples of the recurring tensions between
science and organized religion, and we discuss a number of them. As further motivating
evidence for the economic importance of the issue we also carry out a simple empirical exercise,
with rather striking results: across countries as well as across U.S. states, there is a clear
negative relationship between religiosity and innovation (patents per capita). This nding is
quite robust, and in particular una¤ected by controlling for the standard variables used in the
literature to explain patenting and technological innovation.
The aim of this paper is to shed light on the workings of the science-religion-politics nexus,
as well as its growth and distributional implications. To this end, we develop a model with
three key features: (i) the recurrent arrival of scientic discoveries which, if widely di¤used and
implemented, generate productivity gains but sometimes also erode existing religious beliefs
(an important source of utility for some agents) by contradicting important aspects of the
doctrine; (ii) a government that can allow such ideas and innovations to spread, or spend
resources to censor them and impede their di¤usion. Subsequently, it also chooses the level
of public spending and its allocation between secular public goods (or transfers) and subsidies
(or tax exemptions) for religious activities; (iii) a religious organization or sector (Church or
churches) that can, at a cost, undertake an adaptation of the doctrine new interpretation,
reformation, entry of new cults, etc.that renders it more compatible with the new knowledge,
thereby also alleviating the need for ex-ante blocking by the state.
The game then unfold as follows. Each generation of agents, living for two periods, is com-
posed of (up to) four social classes, corresponding to the religious/secular and rich/poor divides.
At both stages of life these groups compete for power, which may involve forming strategic
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(coalition-proof) alliances with others. The candidate or leader of the group that emerges vic-
torious from the political competition governs the state and implements his preferred policy.
In the rst period (youth), policy choice is over the control of knowledge, namely whether or
not to set up a repressive and propaganda apparatus that will block any belief-eroding discov-
eries or innovations emanating from the sciences. This decision is forward-looking, taking into
account the Churchs optimal repairing behavior and how an erosion of religious agentsbeliefs
would a¤ect subsequent political outcomes. In the second period (old age), the choice is over
scal and social policy: choosing the level of taxes and allocating spending between secular
and religious (belief-complementary) public goods. After each generation dies a new one takes
over, inheriting its predecessors nal stocks of scientic and (for non-secular agents) religious
capital.
We characterize the outcome of these strategic interactions and the resulting joint dynam-
ics of scientic knowledge, TFP, and religious beliefs. We show in particular the emergence of
three basins of attraction: (i) a Western-Europeanor Secularizationregime, with unim-
peded scientic progress, declining religiosity, a passive Church and high levels of taxes and
secular spending; (ii) a Theocraticregime with knowledge stagnation, persistently extreme
religiosity, a Church that makes no e¤ort to adapt since its beliefs are protected by the state,
and also high taxes but now used to subsidize the religious sector; (iii) in-between these two,
an Americanregime that generally (not always) succeeds in combining unimpeded scientic
progress and stable religiosity within an intermediate range where the state does not block
new discoveries and the Church sector nds it worthwhile to invest in doctrinal repair and
adaptation. This regime features lower taxes than the other two, but with revenue or tax
exemptions allocated to religious activities.
We also examine how income inequality interacts, through coalition formation, with the
religious /secular divide, and how this in turn a¤ects equilibrium dynamics. We show in
particular how, in the American regime, a rise in income inequality can lead the religious
rich to form a religious-right alliance with the religious poor and start blocking belief-eroding
discoveries and ideas. Inequality can thus be harmful to knowledge and growth, by inducing
obscurantist, anti-science attitudes and polices.
1.1 Related Literature
Our paper relates to three main lines of work. First, within the large literature on the political
economy of growth, the most closely related papers are those in which governments sometime
resist of delay the adoption of productivity-enhancing technological innovations, due to the
pressure exerted by vested economic interests who would lose from it (e.g., Krusell and Ríos-
Rull (1996), Parente and Prescott (1999), Restuccia (2004), Bellettini and Ottaviano (2005),
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Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) and Bridgman et al. (2007)). Through the adaptationwork
of the Church, the paper also relates to those in which new technologies di¤use only slowly
because they require costly learning (e.g., Chari and Hopenhayn (1991), Caselli (1999)). Unlike
the previous literature, we focus on fundamental science rather than specic technological
devices, and on religious beliefs as a coevolving form of (social) capital occasionally threatened
by new discoveries; such conicts, moreover, can lead to either blocking by the state or to
doctrinal revisions by the Church. Our study thereby relates to and draws on historical work
pertaining to scientic-economic progress and religion, such as Koyré (1957), Mokyr (1992,
1998, 2004), Landes (1998), Greif (2005), Chaney (2008, 2011 2013), Deming (2010), Vander
Hook (2010), Saleh (2012a,b).
Second, our paper also contributes to the literature on the persistence of power, policies
and institutions in a context of distributional conict (e.g., Bénabou (1996, 2000), Acemoglu
and Robinson (2008), Persson and Tabellini (2009) and Acemoglu et al. (2011). We focus
on a very di¤erent source of persistence, however, namely the (endogenous) religiosity of the
population. In this respect, the paper also relates to work on the dynamics of political beliefs
and culture (e.g., North (1990), Greif (1994), Piketty (1995), Bisin and Verdier (2000), Alesina
and Angeletos (2005), Bénabou and Tirole (2006), Tabellini (2008, 2010), Bénabou (2008),
Saint-Paul (2010), Gorodnichenko and Roland (2011), Aghion et al. (2011), Ticchi et al. (2013),
Guiso et al. (2013), Alesina and Giuliano (2013)).
Finally, because religion plays a crucial role in a¤ecting technological and economic growth
(and vice-versa), as well as distributive outcomes, the paper contributes to the literature on
the socioeconomic determinants and consequences of religiosity pioneered by Weber (1905).
Modern contributions include Barro and McCleary (2003a, 2005), Guiso et al. (2003), Cav-
alcanti et al. (2007), Glaeser and Sacerdote (2008), Becker and Woessmann (2009), Kuran
(2011), Botticini and Eckstein (2012) and Levy and Razin (2012), who emphasize the relation-
ship to growth through the accumulation of human and physical capital; Stark et al. (1996)
and Swatos and Christiano (1999), whose main concern is the secularization hypothesis; and
Roemer (1998), Scheve and Stasavage (2006) and Huber and Stanig (2011), who focus on the
interplay between religiosity and the demand for redistribution.
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 present motivating and supporting
evidence, including our empirical ndings, for the questions and mechanisms which the papers
investigates. Section 4 develops our basic model of religion, science and politics, which is
then solved in Section 5 for equilibrium policies and the resulting coevolution of religiosity
and knowledge. Section 6 extends the model, in particular the political-competition game,
to incorporate the interplay of religious and income di¤erences and thus study the e¤ects of
inequality on coalition formation, science policy and equilibrium outcomes. Section 7 concludes.
All proofs are gathered in the Appendix.
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2 Historical and Contemporary Examples
This section discusses important instances, from the Middle Ages to modern times, of conicts
between religion and scientic discoveries, initially arbitrated (often in favor of dogma) by the
ruling powers, and sometimes later resolved through doctrinal revisions and adaptations.1
2.1 Science and Religion in the Muslim World
The Muslim expansion in the Middle East, North Africa and Southern Europe occurred dur-
ing the period 632-732 C.E. The resulting confrontation with the rational sciences such as
philosophy, mathematics and astronomy cultivated in the newly conquered areas posed a dif-
cult challenge for Muslim religious authorities. On the one hand, they viewed foreign or
rational science as an unnecessary addition to the Islamic and Arab science and a po-
tential danger to their faith(Chaney (2008), p. 3). On the other hand, being prevented by
the Koran and the teachings of Muhammad from implementing forceful conversions, they felt
compelled to engaged in logical debates with non-Muslims in the process of proselytizing
Islam.2 Scientic progress ourished in this environment of religious and intellectual plural-
ism and confrontation, with major developments in algebra, trigonometry, the introduction of
Indian numerals and the essentials of decimal reckoning. Progress also occurred in chemistry
and in medicine, and the use of the experimental method became widespread. Technological
innovations of the Muslim civilization include the double-acting suction pump, navigational
instruments (astrolabes, quadrants, globes and the magnetic compass) and important progress
in the development of the clock.3
The initial willingness of Muslim rulers to engage with logic and rational sciences rapidly
declined between the 11th and the 12th centuries, however, and was followed by centuries of
active opposition to the generation and di¤usion of new knowledge.4 In the eleventh century
1The persecution of scholars who challenged prevailing religious views, for instance on astronomy and cos-
mology, dates back much further. Thus, Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (c. 500-428 B.C.) was attacked and forced
into exile (where he eventually committed suicide) because he believed that the sun was a mass of red and hot
material, which was not deemed to be characteristic of divine celestial bodies (Grant (2004), pp. 15-16).
2According to Lewis (2003, p. 33-34), the degree of tolerance for non-Muslim populations at that time was
without precedent or parallel in Christian Europe.
3See Maddison, 2007, ch. 4, pp. 190-191, and Chaney, 2008, p. 6. In addition, translations of Greek and
Indian works in philosophy and science were nanced by the Caliphs, who also created libraries, observatories
and other centers of learning, especially in Baghdad.
4According to Chaney (2008), as the majority of the people living in the conquered territories eventually
converted to Islam between the 11th and the 12th centuries, science, and rational thought in general, lost their
main purpose of supporting such conversions, leaving no reason for religious authorities to even tolerate them.
Similarly, McClellan III and Dorn (2006, p. 114) write that, Islam began as a colonial power, and especially at
the edges of the Islamic imperium multicultural societies ourished at the outset, mingling diverse cultures and
religions Persian, Indian, Arab, African, Greek, Chinese, Jewish, and Christian. As time went on, conversions
increased, and Islam became religiously more rigid and culturally less heterogeneous.
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A.D., Hellenistic studies in the Islamic civilization were on the wane, and by the end of the
twelfth century A.D. they were essentially extinct. (Deming (2010), p. 105). Greek science
and philosophy were excluded from the subjects taught in the madrasas, and any private
institution that might teach the foreign sciences was starved out of existence by the laws
governing waqfs [charitable endowments]. Remarkably, this follows the same path taken by
the Roman Church in the late 4th century: as Christianity became the o¢ cial and dominant
religion of the late Empire, the tolerant Greek scientic and philosophical traditions were
increasingly repressed, and reason made subservient to faith (Freeman (2005)).
The most striking and long-lasting case of knowledge blocking in the Muslim world is
undoubtedly that of the printing press. Johannes Gutenberg began working on his invention
in 1436. The high quality and relatively low price of the rst printed Bible (1455) established
the superiority of his movable-type technique, and printing presses spread very rapidly across
Europe.5 Little opposition came from the Roman Catholic Church (at that time still largely
hegemonic as a spiritual authority), which saw it as a useful device to standardize, reproduce
and disseminate at low cost the Holy Scriptures and religious manuals, as well as prot from the
sale of letters of indulgence (Childress (2008), ch. 6). Ironically, half a century later printing
also proved to be a decisive factor in the rapid di¤usion of the Protestant Reformation that
radically undermined the Churchs hegemony and power in much of Europe.6 Later on, printing
also played a key role in spreading the ideas that ourished during the Scientic Revolution
and the Enlightenment (e.g., Diderot and dAlemberts Encyclopedie, rst published in 1751)
and which set the West on a widely di¤erent path from the rest of the world.
In Muslim lands, by contrast, printing especially in Arabic and Turkishwas strongly
opposed throughout the early-modern and modern periods. In 1515, Sultan Selim I issued
a decree under which the practice of printing would be punishable by death. Printing only
started in the Islamic World at the beginning of the 19th century, partly due to the need for
defensive modernization against the West.
What accounts for the divergent paths of di¤usion of the printing press in Europe and the
Muslim world? In Catholic Europe, where various minor schisms and heretical movements had
been fairly easily suppressed, there was overoptimisticallylittle fear that innovations such as
5By 1500, more than 1,000 printing shops had sprung up in Europe. Printers were turning out an average
of 500 books per week. No other invention had spread so quickly or had such far-reaching e¤ects until that
moment (Vander Hook, 2010, p. 12). It is estimated that during 1436-1500 approximately 15,000 di¤erent
texts were printed in 20 million copies, and in the 16th century 150,000-200,000 di¤erent books and book editions
were printed, totaling more than 200 million copies (see Kertcher and Margalit, 2005).
6Martin Luther, whose 95 Theses (originally posted in 1517) were widely reprinted and circulated, called
printing Gods highest and most extreme gift, by which the business of the Gospel is driven forward(Childress,
2008, ch. 6). Kertcher and Margalit (2005, pp. 17-18) note that over time the Roman Catholic Church realized
how pernicious the printing press was for its own hegemony. In 1479, Pope Sixtus IV thus authorized the
University of Cologne to use ecclesiastical censure against printers, purchasers, and readers of heretical books.
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printed books could undermine religious unity. In contrast, as suggested by McClellan III and
Dorn (2006) and by Chaney (2008), starting in the 12th century Muslim authorities became
increasingly suspicious of innovations, perceiving them as potential threats to their relatively
recent success at converting the conquered populations. By this time Muslims were also already
split between Sunni, Shiite and Su branches, whereas Catholics were still essentially united.
Printing was also less protable in the Ottoman Empire, due to lower wages and literacy rates
that reduced the demand for books.7
The persistence and legacy of the anti-printing, anti-scientic attitudes and policies that
took hold in the Muslim world eight centuries ago are still easily discernible today. The United
Nations2002 Arab Human Development Report (see, e.g., Diner (2009), p. 19) thus found
that during the 1970s, the total number of books translated into Arabic was about one-fth
of the equivalent gure for books translated into modern Greek. In the 1980s, over a ve-year
period, only 4.4 books per million inhabitants were translated in the Arab world, versus 519
for Hungary and 920 for Spain. Focusing on science, the Pakistani nuclear physicist Pervez
Hoodbhoy (2007) reports that the top 46 Muslim countries combined produced 1.17% of world
scientic literature, versus 1.48% for Spain; half of the 28 lowest producers of scientic articles
in 2008 were members of the Organization of Islamic States. At the major University in
Islamabad where he taught at the time, there were three mosques and a fourth one planned,
but no bookstore.8
2.2 The Discovery of Aristotles Natural Philosophy in 12th Century
Part of Aristotles (384-322 B.C.) works, namely two books of the Organon: Categories and
Interpretation, were rst translated into Latin in the early 6th century and became widely read
in Europe. In particular, these works had been regularly taught in the Churchs schools since
the time of Charles the Great [742-818] (Deming, ch. 4, p.135). When the other books of
the Organon (Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, Topics, Sophistical Refutations) were later
translated into Latin, they were also readily incorporated into the Churchs school curriculum
and become known as the New Logic.
During the 12th century, Aristotles previously lost works in natural philosophy such
as Physics, On the Soul, On Generation and Corruption, Metaphysics, Meteorology, and On
7Al-Khalili (2010, p. 235) also reports that potential misspelling in the printing of the Koran was regarded
as sacrilegious by the Muslim religious authorities, as was compressingthe word of God.
8The Economist (2013) similarly reports that The worlds 1.6 billion Muslims have produced only two
Nobel laureates in chemistry and physics. Both moved to the West. The 57 countries in the Organization
of the Islamic Conference spend a puny 0.81% of GDP on research and development, about a third of the
world average. Investment in areas at the interface between pure and applied science is about 5% of GDP in
developed countries, versus a very meager 0.2% in the Arab world. The article also points to some hopeful
recent prospects for a comeback of science in certain (mostly oil-rich) parts of the Islamic world.
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the Heavens, were rediscovered and translated. Unlike the books on logic, which dealt with
abstract principles and rules of thought, these contained doctrines regarding the physical world,
human life and the universe, many of which seemed incompatible with crucial statements in
the Bible. For instance, in Meteorology it is written that there will be no end to time and
the world is eternal,a conclusion that follows out of logical necessity from Aristotles system
but directly contradicts the description of Creation in the book of Genesis. Similarly, in On
the Heavens, Aristotle declared that the world must be unique.In Aristotelian physics, this
follows from the principle that all natural motions of elements are directed toward the center
of the universe, corresponding with the center of the Earth. However, limiting the possible
worlds to one was seen as heretical, because it implied that God was not omnipotent(Deming
(2010), pp. 138-139). Aristotles writings also denied other fundamental pillars of the Christian
faith, such as the possibility of salvation and the immortality of the soul. He further claimed
that it was possible to know God on rational grounds only, whereas the Christian faith rested
upon the principle of divine revelation.
The di¤usion of these heretical writings was quickly opposed by the Church; in 1210
the Synod of Paris (the main center of learning of Aristotles philosophy at the time) issued a
declaration that nor shall the books of Aristotle on natural philosophy, and the commentaries
[of Averroes] be read in Paris in public or secret; and this we enjoin under pain of excommu-
nication,(Deming (2010), p. 137). In 1277 the Bishop of Paris issued a list of 219 heretical
propositions, also backed by threat of excommunication. His inuence waned over time and his
decree was overturned in 1325, thanks to the work of Thomas Aquinas, whose Summa Theolog-
ica successfully merged Aristotelianism with the doctrine of the Church. Aquinasingenuous
intellectual construction represents a perfect example of theological repair and adaptation
following a belief-eroding discovery (or re-rediscovery), namely that of Aristotelian natural
philosophy.9 It allowed the Aristotelian corpus to be accepted and taught by the Church,
temporarily ending the conict that had emerged between science and religion.10 The conict
resurfaced three centuries later, however, when Copernicus (1473-1543) work upended the
whole Aquinian synthesis, which the Church had by then become heavily vested in.
9Aquinas introduced a fundamental distinction between the domain of reason and the domain of faith. All
ultimate truths are elements of faith, but human reason can play an ancillary role. For instance, the doctrine
of Divine Revelation is not acceptable unless it is preceded by a demonstration of the existence of God, an
accomplishment of human reason.
10According to Freeman (2005), Aquinaswork marks the end of the Wests long sleep of reasonthat begun
in the 4th century, when Christianity was established as the o¢ cial religion of the Roman Empire by Theodosius
I. His Edict of Thessalonica (380) was soon followed by persecutions of both pagan (Greek and Roman) religions
and heretical(non-Catholic) Christian sects.
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2.3 Copernicus, Galilei, Newton and the Roman Inquisition
The indivisible atoms could be imagined as moving in a continuum with knowable trajectories. In the
seventeenth century, in the worlds celestial and terrestrial, everything seemed up for grabs; none of
the old certainties about the land masses of our planet, or about the way space and bodies should be
described, could be taken as given. (Jacob and Stewart, 2004, pp. 2-3).
Nicolaus CopernicusOn the Revolution of Celestial Spheres (1543) was important not only
in its own sake, but also because it provided one of the pillars for the forthcoming Scientic
Revolution of the 17th century. While Copernicus (prudently) presented his heliocentric model
of the universe as a pure mathematical hypothesis, for which he could provide no empiri-
cal support, it stood in sharp contrast with the Aristotelian-Ptolemaic cosmological model
endorsed by the Church as a cornerstone of its own world view. Due to its mathematical sim-
plicity and power, Copernicanism quickly attracted the attention of many astronomers, among
them Galileo Galilei (1564-1642).
In 1632, Galilei published the Dialogue on the Two Chief World Systems, which imme-
diately caught the attention of the Church. The book, made the clearest, fullest and most
persuasive yet of arguments in favor of Copernicanism and against traditional Aristotelian-
Ptolemaic astronomy and natural philosophy,(McClellan III and Dorn (2006), p. 230). As a
result, on April 12, 1633, Galileo was forced to stand trial before the Holy Inquisition in Rome,
which found him guilty of vehemently suspected heresy, forced him to abjure, curse and
detesthis opinions and placed all his works, past and future, in the Index of Prohibited Books.
The trials of Galileo and other heretical scientists like the mathematician and astronomer
Giordano Bruno, burnt at the stake in 1600, had wide-ranging consequences. While scientic
inquiry did not entirely die in 1633, the Inquisition was an important cause of the waning of
science in Italy and the displacement of the center of the Scientic Revolution toward Cen-
tral and Northern Europe Holland, France and, most importantly, England (Gusdorf (1969),
Trevor-Roper (1967)).11 In a recent study focusing on Spain, Vidal-Robert (2011) provides
econometric evidence consistent with this argument (and our model), showing that the In-
quisition had signicant and long-lasting negative e¤ects on Spanish economic development,
through the delayed adoption of new technologies.12
In England, on the other hand, The Royal Society of London for Improving Natural Knowl-
edge accepted Galileos work with enthusiasm, not long after his condemnation by the Roman
Inquisition (Boas Hall, 1982). As Goldstone (2000, p. 184) writes, Only in Protestant Europe
11Gusdorf argues that the Italian economic crisis and stagnation of the 17th century (crisi del Seicento) was
largely due to a decline of scientic inquiry and technical innovation caused by the Inquisition. Trevor-Roper
emphasizes the exile of skilled craftsmen eeing religious persecutions. Braudel (1991) o¤ers a critical discussion.
12 Inquisition tribunals persisted in Spain until 1834 (in Portugal, until 1821) The last execution took place
in 1826, in Valenzia; it was that of a school teacher, Cayetano Ripoll, hanged for teaching Deism in his classes.
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was the entire corpus of classical thinking called into question; Catholic regions under the
Counter-Reformations preferred to hold to the mix of Aristotelian and Christian cosmologies
received from Augustine, Ptolemy, and Aquinas. And only in England, for at least a generation
ahead of any other nation in Europe, did a Newtonian culture featuring a mechanistic world-
view, belief in fundamental, discoverable laws of nature, and the ability of man to reshape
his world by using those lawstake hold. The spread of such set of beliefs to a wide variety
of engineers, merchants, ministers, and craftsmen reshaped the entire nations approach to
knowledge and technology.
Newtons Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy rst appeared in 1687. Newtons
work showed that universal laws of gravitation could explain the elliptical motion of the celestial
bodies according to the same principles used to explain the motion of falling bodies on the
earth, a result which again subverted the Aristotelian-Ptolemaic cosmology. Newtons theories
were nonetheless quickly adopted in Britain, including by some authorities of the Church of
England, which eventually accepted his scientic world-view as compatible with the spirit
of the Biblical account of the origin and workings of the universe. In 1727, following a state
funeral, Newton was buried at Westminster Abbey among great statesmen and poets, with
the endorsement of the Church. Newtons work was also very well received in most areas of
Europe outside the reach of the Inquisition (Jacob and Stewart (2004), pp. 14-15).
There are two complementary explanations why the new scientic ideas encountered much
less opposition in England than in countries such as Italy and Spain. First, England already
experienced signicant economic growth during the 16th century, due to the expansion of trade
and industry, while these other countries stagnated under the Inquisition. The opportunity
costs (foregone income) as well as the direct costs (censorship, repression, etc.) of limiting the
circulation of new productivity-enhancing ideas are naturally higher in a more dynamic and
mobile economy; this will also be a key feature of our model.13 Second, as argued by Merton
(1938), Protestant values encouraged scientic inquiry by allowing scientists to identify and
celebrate the inuence of God on the world.14 Through its technological applications, the new
science developed by Isaac Newton was a precursor to the Industrial Revolution. The use of
scientic principles and laws of mechanics in craftwork industries, which until then had relied
on rule-of-thumb formulas and trial-and-error methods, allowed England to become the worlds
13A similar argument is made by Al-Khalili (2010, p. 231) to explain the earlier European Renaissance and
Muslim-world stagnation. In comparison with Renaissance Europe, awash with the riches from the New World,
condent in a new found self-belief so reminiscent of al. Mamu¯ns [8thcentury] Baghdad, the many dynasties of
the Islamic world were facing an uphill struggle against fragmentation and religious conservatism.On the role
of the Atlantic trade in shaping the institutions of major European powers, see also Acemoglu et al. (2005).
14Merton (1938, p. 495) thus writes: The formal organization of values constituted by Puritanism led to the
largely unwitting furtherance of modern science. The Puritan complex of a scarcely disguished utilitarianism;
of intramundane interests; methodical, unremitting action; thoroughgoing empiricism; of the right and even the
duty of libre examen ; of anti-traditionalism all this was congenial to the same values in science.
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rst industrialized nation (see Jacob and Stewart (2004), p.15).
2.4 Creationism, Stem Cell Research and the Politics of Science in the U.S.
All that stu¤ I was taught about evolution and embryology and the big bang theory, all that is lies
straight from the pit of Hell... Its lies to try to keep me and all the folks who were taught that from
understanding that they need a savior... You see, there are a lot of scientic data that Ive found out as
a scientist that actually show that this is really a young Earth. I dont believe that the earths but about
9,000 years old. I believe it was created in six days as we know them. Thats what the Bible says.Rep.
Paul Broun (R-Ga.) also an M.D., June 2012.
Charles Darwins On the Origin of Species (1859) initially met some opposition, but within
a few decades became widely accepted by the scientic community and in many Western
countries, especially more secularized ones where a literal reading of Genesis had already
been undermined by developments in geology and natural sciences. In more religious parts of
the world, human evolution was and remains highly controversial, and a minority view. For
instance, a recent survey (Hameed (2008)) found that fewer than 20% of adults in Indonesia,
Malaysia and Pakistan believed Darwins theory to be true or possibly true, and only 8% in
Egypt. In Europe, the Vatican kept silent on the issue for nearly a century, until Pope Pius
XIIs 1950 encyclical Humani Generis. While still not accepting evolution as an established
fact, it allowed important doctrinal adaptation (in our model, repair) by introducing a
distinction between the possibly material origins of the human body and the necessarily divine
and immediate imparting of the soul.15
The United States is a striking case of a rich and technologically highly advanced country in
which signicant opposition to evolution still persists, and interacts importantly with politics.
Less than 90 years ago, Tennessees Butler Act (1925) prohibited the teaching in schools of any
theory of the origins of humans contradicting the teachings of the Bible, and John Scopes was
tried and convicted for violating it. The law remained on the books until 1967. As reported
by Ruse (2006, p. 249) A 2001 Gallup poll reported that 45% of Americans thought that
God created humans as they are now, 37% let some kind of guided evolution do the job, and
12% put us down to unguided natural forces... A 2001 National Science Foundation survey
on science literacy similarly found that 47% of Americans think that humans were created
instantaneously, and 52% believe that humans and dinosaurs coexisted.A well organized and
well-funded movement has successfully pushed for the teaching and dissemination of creation
science, and today creationism is taught in 15 to 20% of American schools.
15The Teaching Authority of the Church does not forbid that... research and discussions, on the part of men
experienced in both [human sciences and sacred theology], take place with regard to the doctrine of evolution,
in as far as it inquires into the origin of the human body as coming from pre-existent and living matter for the
Catholic faith [only] obliges us to hold that souls are immediately created by God.
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Does this matter in practice? Indeed it does, through the political process the coalitions it
gives rise to and their consequences for science policy, innovation and informed decision-making.
Over the last few decades, a powerful coalition of religious conservatives and antigovernment
activists - the Religious Right  has arisen and exerted considerable power in American
politics, both at the local and at the national levels, imposing constraints on education and
research in certain areas of the life sciences, biotechnology and climatology. Its inuence can
be seen, for instance, in the science policies of President George W. Bush, whose election
and reelection relied in great part on this constituency. Almost immediately after coming to
o¢ ce, President Bush severely restricted federal funding for research on embryonic stem cells,
invoking in explicitly religious terms the sacrality and inviolability of all human life. During
his second term, in July 2006, he used his rst Presidential veto on the Stem Cell Research
Enhancement Act. Only after eight years a long time given the pace of modern research
were most of these restrictions lifted, as President Barack Obama came to power.
It is worth noting that the rise of the Religious Right coalition between religious conser-
vatives and small-government, anti-tax interests groups (starting with President Reagan but
really culminating with the 2000 election of President Bush) coincided with a sharp and lasting
rise in US income inequality, especially since the 90s. Explaining this coincidenceis another
motivation of our paper. The model will indeed show that greater inequality can cause some of
the richer classes, whose productive interests normally lead them to favor technical progress,
to form a science-unfriendly alliance with the religious poor in order to prevent a secular-left
coalition from gaining power and implementing substantial redistribution.16
Religion-politics-science dynamics are also quite powerful at the local level. Eight states
(Arkansas, Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota and Virginia)
currently still ban or limit human stem-cell research; all but Michigan, are red states,whose
residents predominantly vote for the Republican party. In 2011, the state of Kentucky allocated
more than $40 million in tax incentives for a planned expansion of the Creation Museum,
through the addition of a theme park designed to demonstrate the literal truth of the story of
Noahs ark. Following evolution and biotechnology, the latest front in the push-back against
science by religious-conservative alliances is climate change. In 2012, for instance, North
Carolina passed a law banning its state agencies from basing coastal policies on the latest
scientic predictions concerning the rise in sea level. The next section will show that such
policies, or more precisely the high levels of religiosity that bring them about, are systematically
associated with lower innovation.
16On the rise and inuence on American politic of the alliance between religious-fundamentalist and anti-
government forces, see Mooney (2005) Phillips (2006), Gelman (2008) and Wuthnow (2012).
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3 Innovation and Religiosity Across Countries and States
3.1 Cross-Country Patterns
We use international data to analyze the relationship between religiosity and innovativeness,
both in raw form and controlling for the standard determinants of technological innovation used
in the empirical literature. To our knowledge, these are entirely new analyses and ndings.
We use two measures of religiosity, taken from Barro and McCleary (2003b) and corre-
sponding respectively to the answers to the World Values Survey (WVS) questions: (i) Inde-
pendently of whether you go to church or not, would you say you are: a religious person, not
a religious person, a convinced atheist, dont know, and: (ii) Do you believe in God? Yes,
No, Dont Know. These variables are scaled to [0,1], corresponding to the shares of people
who consider themselves religious, or believe in God; their sample correlation is 0.8.17
To measure innovation, we use (log-) patents per capita. The patent counts, taken from
the World Intellectual Policy Organization (WIPO), are total patent applications led in a
country by both residents and foreigners (using only residents leads to similar results). They
are measured in the same years as the religion data, namely 1980, 1990, 1995, 2000, as are the
control variables described below.
Figure 1 Figure 2
Figures 1 and 2 report the basic scatterplot between national measures of religiosity and
innovation: a strong negative relationship is clearly apparent in both cases. Columns 1 and 2
of Table 1 report the regression estimates of these relationships.
17Barro and McClearys dataset uses four waves of the World Value Survey (WVS), from 1980 to 2000.
They complete this data (corresponding to about 95% of our sample) by using the International Social Survey
Programme (ISSP, 1990-93 and 1998-2000) and the Gallup Millennium Survey (GMS, 1999). Our results are
robust to: (i) using as alternative measures from the WVS Importance of religion in your lifeand Importance
of God in your life; (ii) incorporating the 2005 WVS data, available for all but the Belief in Godquestion.
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Figure 3 Figure 4
We next include a religious-freedom index (Norris and Inglehart (2011)), since such a
variable doctrinal adaptabilityalso plays an important role in our model, and control for
the main variables typically used as regressors in empirical work on innovation: (i) the level of
economic development, measured by (log) GDP per capita, from the Penn World Tables; (ii)
log-population (from the World Development Indicators), to take into account possible scale
e¤ects in the process of innovation; (iii) the protection of intellectual property, as measured
by Parks (2008) index of patent rights; (iv) years of tertiary schooling, from Barro and Lee
(2013); (v) the net inow of foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP, taken from the
WDI. Figures 3 and 4 display the scatterplots of each measure of religiosity with the residuals
obtained from regressing innovation on these six variables; Columns 3 and 4 of Table 1 report
the corresponding regressions. The strong negative relationship found in the raw data is clearly
conrmed. The estimation results also show the role played by religious freedom, which as shall
see is also in line with our model.18
A number of robustness checks leave the key ndings unchanged. Columns 5-6 add year
xed e¤ects and Columns 7-8 dummy variables for the predominant religion in the country
(professed by over 50% of the population according to the CIA World Factbook). In all cases,
religiosity is signicantly and negatively associated with innovation per capita, and religious
freedom positively.19
18The control variables have the expected sign and are signicant (except for intellectual property protection,
which is not). GDP per capita, tertiary education and FDI are all negatively correlated with religiosity, explain-
ing why its coe¢ cient falls (though remaining highly signicant) when they are included. These e¤ects can be
seen as intervening mechanisms fully consistent with our model: high religiosity and the associated restrictions
on free inquiry and knowledge ows discourage investment in both human and physical inputs into innovation.
19Having a predominant religion is, unsurprisingly, highly correlated with average religiosity. These dummies
thus also reduce the latters (still signicant) coe¢ cient as they are in large part capturing the same e¤ect.
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3.2 The United States
We now carry out a similar investigation across U.S. states. This is instructive for several rea-
sons. First, it keeps constant a host of political, historical and institutional factors that vary
signicantly across countries. Second, the United States is a scientic leader in many domains,
but also the advanced country with a long and recently intensifyinghistory of clashes be-
tween politicized religious interests and science. We mentioned earlier several important cases
of blocking a¤ecting scientic education, research, and public policy at the national and,
especially, local levels. It is therefore important to understand whether and how religiosity
and innovation covary across the major political decision units within the country, namely the
States. Finally, like the cross-country patterns identied above, this question and the ndings
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Belief in God
Figure 6
The measures of religiosity are constructed from the 2008 Religious Landscape Survey, con-
ducted by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life.20 The questions asked were: (i) How
important is religion in your life very important, somewhat important, not too important,
or not at all important?; (ii) Do you believe in God or a universal spirit yes, no, other,
dont know/refused?Our rst index, which we call Importance of Religion, is the share of
individuals who answered very important to question (i). Our second measure, Belief in
God, is the share who answered Yesto question (ii). The correlation between them is 0.89.
Innovation is again measured by (log) patents per capita, dened as the ratio between the total
number of patents submitted by State residents to the U.S. Patent and Trademark O¢ ce and
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Belief in God
Figure 8
20A representative sample of 35,556 adults living in the continental states was surveyed in the summer of
2007, and supplemental samples of 200 adults living in Alaska and 201 living in Hawaii in the spring of 2008.
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A strong negative relationship between religiosity and innovation is again evident on Figures
5 and 6, as well from the estimates reported in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.
As in the cross-country analysis, we next control for: (i) the (log) Gross State Product
per capita; (ii) the (log) population of the State; (iii) the level of tertiary education, measured
here by the share of population over 25 with at least a Bachelors degree. All variables refer to
2007 and are taken from the Indiana Business Research Center at Indiana University. Figures
7 and 8 display the scatterplots of each measure of religiosity with the residuals obtained from
regressing innovation on the set of control variables. The corresponding regressions are reported
in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2. In both cases, the strong negative relationship displayed in
the raw data is conrmed.21 Innovation, unconditional or conditional, is especially low in the
Bible Belt states, but the negative association holds throughout the sample.
Naturally, neither the cross-country nor the cross-state regressions allow denite causal
inferences to be drawn. The controls used eliminate some rst-order sources of potential
misspecication, but only instrumental variables or natural experiments would allow for proper
identication. While this may be a route worth pursuing in future work, the purpose of the
empirical exercises carried out here is di¤erent: to bring to light a rather striking newfact
that strengthens / adds to the need for or a formal analysis of the coevolution of science and
religiosity. In the framework we develop, causality actually goes both ways, leading societies
to di¤erent long-term regimes (depending on initial conditions and historical accidents), which
is consistent with the stable cross-sectional patterns found in the data.
21Adding FDI inows (from the BEA) as a share of GSP leaves the results unchanged (Columns 5-6), as does




Preferences and endowments. We consider an economy in discrete time, populated by non-
overlapping generations of agents living for two periods: youth (t even) and old age (t + 1
odd). There is no population growth. Each generation is formed by a continuum of risk-
neutral individuals i 2 [0; 1] with preferences
U it = Et[cit + cit+1 + ibt+1Gt+1]; (1)
where (cit; c
i
t+1) denote agent is post-tax-and-transfer consumption levels while 
ibt+1Gt+1
is the utility which he derives (in old age only, for simplicity) from organized religion, as
follows. A fraction 1  r of agents are non-religious or secularand thus have i = 0; whereas
i = 1 for religiousindividuals, who are in the majority: r > 1=2: While the distribution of
types is xed, the intensity of religious agentsbeliefs during their lifetimes, (bt; bt+1); will be
endogenous. In old age, beliefs are complementary with a religious public goodGt+1 such as
sanctuaries (churches, temples, mosques) and priests who perform rituals, o¤er spiritual help,
etc. The uncertainty at date t concerns next periods levels of TFP and religiosity, which will
depend on the occurrence, nature and implementation of scientic discoveries.
For both simplicity and realism, we shall model faith not as a probability distribution over
some state of the (after)world that is updated in a Bayesian manner, but as a durable stock
of religious capitalbt that may be eroded by certain shocks especially, scientic newsand
augmented by others, as detailed in the next subsection.22
For the moment we take agents to di¤er only in their attitudes or propensities toward
religion, i = 0; 1: Thus all have the same income, normalized to the economys total fac-
tor productivity, denoted (at; at+1) in each period of their life. All real magnitudes such as
cit; c
i
t+1; Gt+1; etc., will be measured in units of contemporary TFP.
Taxes and public expenditures. Given a linear income tax rate  ; government revenues
(per unit of TFP) are equal to R(); with the following properties:
Assumption 1 : R () is C3 and strictly quasiconcave, with R(0) = 0, R0(0) = 1 and R0(^) =
0; where ^ is the revenue-maximizing tax rate. Furthermore R000()  0 for all  2 [0; ^ ]:
Religious agents are the most numerous and thus always control the state (whether through
the sword or the ballot box), choosing the tax rates ( t;  t+1) levied on agentsincomes as well
22For explicit models of religious beliefs as probabilistic beliefs responding to new information, see Bénabou
and Tirole (2006) and Levy and Razin (2013).
17
as how to allocate spending.23 In the second period of life, agents potentially value two types
of public expenditures. The rst one is the religious public good Gt+1; which can be provided
either directly (state religion) or through tax exemptions, subsidies and other advantages
conceded to the religious sector to help sustain its activities. For expositional clarity we shall
treat Gt+1 as directly nanced from government revenues, but other channels of subsidization
are equivalent. What is key is that only part of the population benets from it, so that it
involves a form of redistribution from the secular to the religious.24 In contrast, the second
type of public expenditures, denoted Tt+1; is valued equally by those with i = 1 and i = 0:
These are standard public goods and services such as infrastructure, safety, basic education,
etc. Alternatively, Tt+1 may correspond to lump-sum transfers (e.g., pensions), and we shall
also refer to it as such in anticipation of Section 6, where it will be demanded by the poor but
not by the rich (thus introducing a second dimension of political conict). A unit of Tt+1 is
worth  > 1 units of numeraire-good consumption to old agents, so that the net consumption
levels of generation t are
cit = 1   t and cit+1 = 1   t+1 + Tt+1:
During youth (period t) there is no public-goods consumption. Instead, the states only deci-
sion, t 2 f0; 1g; is whether or not to invest resources in a control and repression apparatus
designed to block the di¤usion of any new ideas deemed sacrilegious and dangerous to the
faith. The technology and incentives for blocking are described below; denoting by 't the
direct resource cost required to set up a repressive apparatus, we can already write the (TFP-
normalized) governments budget constraints as
t't  R ( t) and Tt+1 +Gt+1  R ( t+1) : (2)
4.2 Discoveries, Productivity Growth, and Blocking
Innovations. Scientic discoveries occur, with some exogenous Poisson arrival rate ; during
the rst subperiod in the life-cycle of each generation.25 If allowed to di¤use widely they will
produce, at the start of the second subperiod, advances in practical knowledge and technology
that raise TFP from at to at+1 = (1+ )at: Besides shifting out the production possibility
23This will no longer be the case when there are also income di¤erences between agents. Note also that the
political system need not be democratic: group sizes are to be understood as power-weighted, and outcomes
may be determined through violent conict (e.g., the larger military force wins) rather than voting.
24 It could even be that everyone benets from Gt+1; or from Gt+1
R
bit+1di; for instance if religiosity has
positive spillovers, as long as some citizens benet more than others. On intergroup conict over the mix of
public goods see, e.g., Alesina et al. (1999), Luttmer (2001) and Alesina and La Ferrara (2005).
25 It would be easy to endogenize . The risk of having their discoveries blocked would then reduce scientists
incentives to do research, thus reinforcing the adverse impact of blocking policies on knowledge and TFP growth.
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frontier, scientic advances can also have major e¤ects on religious beliefs, as discussed earlier.
In particular, new scientic ndings that contradict the professed doctrine and sacred texts
statements about the natural world (from the origins of the universe or mankind to the deter-
minants of moral behavior or the cognitive abilities of women) tend to shake and weaken the
faith of religious agents. Not all discoveries have such e¤ects, of course, and we accordingly
distinguish between two main types:
- A fraction pN of them are belief-neutral (BN), meaning that they have no impact on b:
- A fraction pR = 1  pN are belief-eroding (BR): if they di¤use widely in the population,
they reduce the stock of religious capital from bt to bt+1 = (1  )bt:
Later on we shall also allow for belief-enhancing (BE) shocks, which increase b:While reli-
giosity occasionally benets from certain technological innovations (e.g., televised evangelism,
videotapes), one is hard-pressed to think of cases where a discovery in basic science had such an
e¤ect. Increases in religiosity generally arise instead from very di¤erent sources, such as immi-
gration, cultural change, or increased demand for reassurance, divine forgiveness and salvation
following major disasters (Great Plague, famine, war, humiliating defeat, etc.).26 We shall
therefore introduce belief-enhancing shocks only later on, as events occurring between rather
than within generations, independently of scientic discoveries and political developments.27
For the moment, we abstract from them.
Blocking. If allowed to disseminate, a BR discovery will reduce the utility bt+1G t+1 of
religious agents, through both its direct erosion of their faith and the ensuing reduction in
Gt+1: If this loss more than o¤sets the gains to be reaped from higher TFP, the government,
representing here the religious majority, may want to block censor, deny, restrict access to,
etc. the new knowledge. We assume that blocking can be targeted at BR innovations and
that it is then fully e¤ective, so that the beliefs of religious citizens (and of the government
representing them) remain unchanged, as does TFP: at+1 = at and bt+1 = bt:28
Censoring dangerous ideasemanating from scientic inquiry and methodology involves
two types of costs. First are the foregone TFP gains that could be reaped from applications of
26For instance, Chaney [2013] documents how, in ancient Egypt, exceptionally low or high Nile oods led to an
increased demand for religious goods and services provided by the priesthood and a concomitant strengthening
of the latters political power.
27Besides realism, the main purpose is simplication, as this also allows us to abstract from the issue of
a (secular) government blocking religiosity-enhancing ideas and inuences. While this certainly occurred in
Communist countries, and can be incorporated in an extension of the model, it is outside our present focus.
In particular, such shocks typically have no direct connection to scientic and technological progress, and their
other potential e¤ects on TFP are generally ambiguous e.g., they can lead to more moralbehavior, but also
to religious strife and violent conict.
28This also means that innovations that are blocked at date t are lost forever, unless independently rediscovered
or reinvented at some future date. In practice there will be some leakage, so that blocking only slows down
di¤usion but possibly for a long time, as with the Inquisition, the printing press and stem cell research.
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that knowledge. Second is the direct cost required to set up, in advance, a repressive apparatus
that will stand ready to quash such ideas, or more generally impede their di¤usion. Exam-
ples include functionaries devoted to monitoring and repressing hereticalor blasphemous
notions and their proponents (Inquisition, religious police); enforcing the censorship of school
lessons and textbooks, if not banning printing outright; and subsidizing an o¢ cial or parallel
doctrine-friendly science(creationism, climate change denial, etc.).29
Since resources must be committed before knowing what type of discovery (if any) will
occur, setting or maintaining a repressive apparatus is a form of investment under uncertainty,
paying o¤ (for religious agents) with probability pR: The normalized resource cost 't required
is assumed to depend only on societys current level of knowledge and TFP, at :
't = ' (at) ; (3)
where ' : R+ ! R+ is a smooth and strictly increasing function with '  lima!+1 '(a) <
R(^): The fact that a'(a) rises more than proportionately with a captures the idea that
new knowledge is, on net, more di¢ cult to contain, repress or counteract in a society that
is intellectually and technologically more sophisticated. For instance, the dissemination of
information becomes faster and less controllable with the availability of media such as the
printing press, radio, TV, fax, the internet, etc. The upper bound on ' ensures that repression
nonetheless remains a scally feasible strategy for the government at any level of a:
In contrast to role of the stock of knowledge a, 't is independent of the stock of religious
capital, b: Indeed the costs (per unit of GDP) of impeding the ow of free information 
censoring, threatening scientists, controlling the press, etc. seem fairly independent of the
content of that information and of the strength of the beliefs it might impact.30
4.3 The Church
In addition to regular citizens and the government, there is also a small (zero-measure) set
of agents, drawn from among the religious, who produce no income in either period but may
engage in another type of work. Whenever a BR scientic discovery occurs and is allowed to
di¤use through society, this player, referred to as the Church or religious sector, can attempt
to repair the damage done to the faith by the fact that the new knowledge invalidates or
29We assume that the states repressive apparatus (or the privately operated but state-subsidized information-
garbling, pseudo-science sector) insulates not only religious citizens, but also the government in o¢ ce, from
learning or properly assimilating BR discoveries. There is thus never any divergence of interest between the
religious majority and the government representing them.
30More generally, the assumption serves as a neutral benchmark in which two o¤setting e¤ects cancel out: (i)
more explosiveand belief-damaging information may be, as such, more costly to block; (ii) more intensely re-
ligious citizens and functionaries may be more willing to believe and cooperate with politico-religious authorities
proclaiming that heretics or apostates are disseminating sacrilegious lies and frauds.
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conicts with its doctrine. This may occur through internal reform, such as working out and
proclaiming a reinterpretation of the sacred texts more compatible with scientic facts. It
could also take the form of a major schism or conictual Reformation, or even the creation
of new sects and religions by competing faith entrepreneurs. For simplicity we shall treat
organized religion as a single actor, with preferences given by
Et [bt+1Gt+1   tbt] : (4)
The Church thus cares primarily about the strength of beliefs bt+1 in the religious population
and the provision of complementary goods and services, Gt+1; which together generate benets
bt+1Gt+1 for the faithful.31 The second term in (4) reects the e¤ort costs involved if, following
the di¤usion of a BR innovation, it undertakes the work required to prevent religious capital
from eroding. This decision is denoted by t 2 f0; 1g ; and the cost (per unit of TFP) of
attempting repair is bt; where  is a constant parameter and bt reects the fact that a larger
stock of religious capital (e.g., more devout beliefs) is more expensive to adapt and reform.32
Consistent with the empirical results of Section 3.1, a key determinant of  is religious freedom,
namely the ease with which heterodox interpretations, new sects or cults are allowed to develop,
and people allowed to switch a¢ liation.33
Repairing can only be attempted after the new discovery di¤uses, as the revision in the
doctrine must be appropriately tailored to it. It succeeds with probability q 2 [0; 1]; in which
case the damage done by the innovation to the beliefs of the faithful is completely undone
(for simplicity), so that bt+1 = bt: If repairing fails, on the other hand, religious capital is
eroded just as as much as if there had been no attempt to preserve it: bt+1 = (1   )bt:: The
expectation in (4) reects the uncertain e¤ectiveness of theological repair work.
4.4 Timeline
The timing of events and moves in each generation is illustrated in Figure 5:
 First period (t even):
1. The (religious) majority decides whether or not to invest in the capacity to block possible
BR innovations: t 2 f0; 1g; with corresponding cost t'(at); requiring taxes to be set
at the level  t such that R( t) = t'(at):
31For our purposes, it does not matter whether the Church altruistically internalizes the spiritual welfare of
its brethren or selshly appropriates rents from it, e.g. by being the main conduit for the delivery of Gt+1:
32The cost is borne only by the Church in the form of costly e¤ort (by priests, monks, etc.) so, unlike the
cost of blocking it does not enter into the governments budget constraint.
33Other factors include specic adaptability features of the dominant religion: whether there are multiple
sacred texts or a single one, whether it is / they are said to be written by men or dictated verbatim by God,
how specic are the statements they make about the natural world, etc.
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Figure 5: timing of events in each generation
2. With probability ; a new discovery is made. If it is belief-neutral or if there is no
blocking of belief-eroding ideas, it di¤uses and becomes embodied in new technologies,
so that at+1 = (1 + )at: If it is repressed, at+1 = at:
3. If a BR discovery occurred and the state allowed it to di¤use, the Church decides whether
to repair the resulting damage to religious capital. Such attempts involve a cost of bt
and succeed with probability q; in which case bt+1 = bt: If there is no attempt or if it
fails, beliefs erode to bt+1 = (1  )bt:
 Second period (t+ 1 odd):
1. Given the realized values of (at+1; bt+1); the religious majority chooses scal and public-
spending policy, ( t+1; Tt+1; Gt+1); subject to the government budget constraint.
2. The political stage game ends, a new generation is born at the beginning of (even)
period t + 2 and the same game is played again with the inherited stocks of knowledge
and religiosity (at+2; bt+2) = (at+1; bt+1):
Equilibrium. We focus on pure strategy subgame-perfect equilibria (SPE). Because there are
no individual-level links across generations such as altruism or asset values, each cohorts time-
horizon is limited to its two-period lifespan. The SPEs of the whole dynamic game therefore
correspond to sequences of SPEs of the basic three-stage game played within each generation,






Figure 6: equilibrium tax rate as a function of religiosity
5 Political Equilibrium
5.1 Fiscal Policy (Second Subperiod)
The religious majority sets taxes and spending as follows:
max
^
f1   +  [R() G] + bG j 0    ^ ; G  R()]: (5)
When beliefs are weak, b < , secular public goods are valued more than religious ones, so
G = 0 and all revenue is spent on T: Furthermore, given the properties of R(); the rst-order
condition uniquely yields  = (), where
(x)  (R0) 1(1=x) (6)
denes a strictly increasing function  : R+ 7 ! [0; ^ ]:When beliefs are strong enough, b  ,
all revenues are spent instead on G : T = 0 and  = (b):34 Figure 6 displays the optimal tax
rate as a function of b:
Proposition 1 The scal policy implemented in the second period is the following:
(1) If b < , then ( ; T;G) = ((); R(()); 0); with () and R(()) increasing in :
(2) If b  , then ( ; T;G) = ((b); 0; R((b))); with (b) and R((b)) increasing in b until
(b) reaches ^ and constant afterwards.
For any b and ; we shall denote second-period equilibrium spending on G as
G (b; ) 

0 if b < 
R ((b)) if b   : (7)
34When b =  we break the indi¤erence in favor of G; without loss of generality.
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Figure 7: Churchs expected value of repairing beliefs
5.2 Churchs Belief-Repairing Strategy
Since working to repair the damage done to b by a BR innovation succeeds with probability
q, the Church attempts it if and only if
qbG (b; ) + (1  q) (1  ) bG ((1  ) b; )  b  (1  ) bG ((1  ) b; ) :
Denote the payo¤ from successful repair, normalized by both TFP a and religiosity b, as
 (b; )  G (b; )  (1  )G ((1  ) b; ) : (8)
The Church therefore attempts repairs when
 (b; )  =q: (9)
The following result, illustrated in Figure 7, shows that  (; ) is strictly single-peaked.
Lemma 1 The function  (b; ) equals 0 for b < ; then jumps up to  (; ) = R(()): It
is continuous and strictly increasing on [; =(1   )); then jumps down to  (=(1  ); ) =
R ((=(1  ))) (1  )R (()) : Finally, it is continuous and strictly decreasing on [=(1 
);+1), with limb!+1  (b; ) = R(^) > 0:
These properties imply that, for all y in (R(^);  (=(1  ); )); the set of bs where
 (b; )  y is an interval [b (; y); b+(; y)]; with   b (; y) < =(1   ) < b+(; y): The
following condition then ensures that the repairing region of the state space is non-empty.
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Assumption 2 R(^) < =q < R((=(1  )))  (1  )R(()):35
Dening b  b (; =q) and b  b+(; =q); we can now fully characterize the optimal
(best-response) behavior of the Church.
Proposition 2 There exist a unique b and b, with
  b < 
1   <
b; (10)
such that the Church attempts to repair belief-eroding innovations (not blocked by the state) if





Intuitively, when religious capital is below b it is not worth repairing, given the cost :
Conversely, when it exceeds a nite threshold b there is enough of it (and therefore also enough
demand for G) that the Church can a¤ord to let it depreciate somewhat.
5.3 State Policy Toward Science (First Subperiod)
The only decision taken during period t is whether to invest in blocking potential BR discover-
ies, trading o¤ the option value of preserving religious capital against the foregone TFP gains
and the cost of setting up a repressive apparatus.
There are two cases in which the government (religious majority) clearly does not nd it
optimal to invest in blocking. First, when b <  religious agents themselves prefer secular
public goods (or transfers) to religious ones, so they set G = 0 and derive no utility from
organized religion (bG = 0); this will remain a fortiori true if b falls to (1   )b: Second, if
the state expects the Church to attempt repair of unblocked BR innovations, and if it has
su¢ cient condence that it will succeed, it prefers to strategically take a passon blocking
and let the Church do the work.
Assumption 3 : q  1= (1 + ) :
This condition, in which both q and the opportunity cost of blocking (foregone productivity
gains) enter in an intuitive manner, ensures that the government never nds it optimal to block




(see Lemma 6 in Appendix 8.2).
We now analyze blocking policy in the remaining two no-repair regions, b > b and   b < b:
As illustrated in Figure 8, in each case blocking will occur when (at; bt) lies above an upward-
sloping locus in the state space, meaning that society is su¢ ciently religious, relative to its
state of scientic and technical development. It will be useful to dene, for all u  0;
35The interval in which =q must lie is itself always nonempty, as the function R((b)) (1 )R(((1 )b))
is decreasing (see Lemma 1). Even though q will be constrained (see Assumption 3),  is not, and therefore =q
is unconstrained.
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Figure 8: the repairing and blocking regions.
V (u)  1  (u) + uR ((u)) ; (11)
corresponding to religious agentsold-age utility when the government nances a public good
which they value at u per unit relative to the numeraire, and does so by setting the tax rate
at the corresponding optimal level (u): In equilibrium, u = maxfb; g by Proposition 1.
5.3.1 Region 1: b > b: No repairing, continued provision of religious public goods
Recall that blocking BR discoveries requires an ex-ante investment of ' (a) ; which must be
nanced by a tax rate of  = R 1 (' (a)) on rst-period consumption. Beliefs are then fully
protected from erosion, so the expected intertemporal utility of the religious majority is
V B(a; b) = 1 R 1 (' (a)) + [1  + pR +  (1  pR) (1 + )]V (b) ; (12)
where V (b) is their second-period utility when no new idea is implemented, either because
none occurred (probability 1 ) or it was of the BR type and thus blocked (probability pR).
If a BN innovation occurs, however, it is implemented, raising second-period TFP and utility
by a factor of 1 + ; as reected in (12).
Suppose now that the government foregoes blocking; BR innovations will then also di¤use
and raise standards of living, but at the same time erode religious beliefs to b0  (1  ) b; and
in this range Church does not repair. Since b > b > =(1   ); religious capital nonetheless
remains high enough that G(b0) > 0 is chosen over secular spending, so the intertemporal
expected utility of religious agents is






The government opts for blocking when V B  V NB; namely
R 1 (' (a))  pR

V (b)  (1 + )V  b0  1 (b) : (14)
The left-hand side is the direct cost of the repressive investment, which is increasing in current
TFP a: The right-hand side is the net expected return: with probability pR a BR innovation
occurs, in which case beliefs are protected from erosion but the productivity gains are foregone.
Using (11), this expected return can be rewritten as
1 (b) = pR

1  (b) + bR ((b))  (1 + ) 1  (b0) + b0R((b0))	 : (15)
In Appendix 8.3 we show that where 1 (b)  0; it is strictly increasing in b; dening the
function B1   1 1 R 1  '; it follows that:
Proposition 3 For b > b; the state implements the blocking of BR discoveries if and only if
(a; b) lies above the upward-sloping locus b = B1(a):
The assumption that '  ' implies that B1 (a) reaches an upper bound and subsequently
becomes at at a nite level of a; as illustrated in Figure 8.
5.3.2 Region 2:   b <b. No repairing, no provision of religious public goods
In this case b0 = (1  ) b <  so an unblocked, unrepaired BR discovery damages beliefs
su¢ ciently that religious agents now prefer secular public spending: G = 0 and T = R (()) :
Thus, while the value of blocking remains given by (12), the value of not blocking is now
V NB(a; b) = 1 + [1  +  (1  pR) (1 + )]V (b) + pR (1 + )V () : (16)
The condition V NB  V B therefore becomes
R 1 (' (a))  pR [V (b)  (1 + )V ()]  2 (b) : (17)
Using (11), the right-hand side of (17) can be rewritten as
2 (b) = pR f1  (b) + bR ((b))  (1 + ) [1  () + R (())]g : (18)
In Appendix 8.3 we show that 2 (b) is increasing, hence so is B2   2 1 R 1  ':
Proposition 4 For   b < b; the state implements the blocking of BR discoveries if and only
if (a; b) lies above the upward-sloping locus b = B2(a):
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Figure 8 illustrates the two blocking loci, Bi(a) for i = 1; 2; as well as the repairing and
non-repairing regions.
5.4 Dynamics of Scientic Progress and Religiosity
We have now fully characterized the law of motion of (at ; bt) within a generation. Between
generations, the simplest case is where the young inherit, without change, the nals stocks of
knowledge and religiosity of the old: (at+2; bt+2) = (at+1; bt+1); as indicated in Figure 5. In
this simple benchmark, however, religiosity can only decrease or, at best, remain constant. As
discussed earlier, in practice there are also periodical events and societal changes than enhance
religiosity. Because they are almost never linked to scientic discoveries, we shall take them as
exogenous: at the start of each new generation at+2 = at+1; but bt+2 = bt+1 with probability
1  pE and bt+2 = (1 + )bt+1 with probability pE ; where  > 0:36
Figures 9a and 9b respectively show the models phase dynamics of (at; bt) without and
with belief-enhancing shocks, in each of the key regions identied by the within-generation
equilibrium analysis. While the underlying system of switching stochastic di¤erence equations
is too complicated to solve analytically, its key qualitative features are apparent from the
graphs and from computing, inside each region, the expected (or average) trajectory of the
state variable, which is governed by a simple linear di¤erence equation. We focus on the three
main regions of interest.
1. Non-blocking, non-repair secularization region: Western Europe, or the United States
when bt=at is relatively low:
Et (at+1) =at = 1 + ; (19)
Et (bt+1) =bt = (1  pR)(1 + pE): (20)
2. Non-blocking with repair region: United States when bt=at is moderately high, Singapore.37
Et (at+1) =at = 1 + ; (21)
Et (bt+1) =bt = [1  pR (1  q) ](1 + pE): (22)
3. Blocking region: Theocratic regimes (Medieval Europe, Ottoman Empire, Ancient China,
Pakistan), United States when bt=at is very high:38
36One could also endogenize them. For instance, when the religious sector invests in adaptation following a BR
discovery, it may, when successful, do better than just o¤setting the damage, i.e. reset to bt+1 = (1+ )bt > bt:
37Singapore is another country notable for successfully combining relatively high (and very diverse) religiosity
with a strong emphasis on technology and innovation (Pereira (2006)).
38There is also a blocking region where b is relatively low but a is even lower, corresponding to a poor society
with relatively little organized religion. This state is transient (though potentially long-lasting), as the system
will always escape it, evolving into either the modern-Europeanor the Americanregime.
28
Et (at+1) =at = 1 +  (1  pR) ; (23)
Et (bt+1) =bt = 1 + pE: (24)
Figure 9a: dynamics without BE shocks Figure 9b: dynamics with BE shocks
Consider in particular the case where
gEUR  (1  pR)(1 + pE) < 1  [1  pR (1  q) ](1 + pE)  gUSR :
Western Europeand the United Statesthen grow at the same rate 1+ (neither blocks),
but in the former there is a downward trend in religiosity (with periodic upward shocks prevent-
ing a degenerate long-distribution), whereas in the latter it is mostly o¤set by the adaptation of
the religious sector, resulting in trendless uctuations or very slow-moving shifts in religiosity
(if gUSR 6= 1). Provided a society is not excessively religious (b < b); economic growth can thus
occur both with and without secularization, as a result of (endogenously) di¤erent responses of
the religious sector. In the theocratic region b > b; meanwhile, religiosity trends up while
knowledge and TFP stagnate, particularly if R  1:
For societies that are close to a boundary between two regimes, nally, a variety of economic
and political shocks can precipitate a phase transition, with changes in both scal and science
policy. We investigate below a particularly important channel for such shifts.
6 Inequality, Religion and the Politics of Science
We now enrich the model to investigate the interplay between religious and class di¤erences.
In each generation, a fraction n < 1=2 of agents are rich and a majority 1   n > 1=2 are
poor: their respective pretax incomes are H and L in both youth and old age (per unit of
contemporary TFP).
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Assumption 4 : Let L <  < H ; with nH + (1  n) L  1:
Income and religiosity are distributed independently, so the four social groups in the
economy and their respective sizes are: secular poor, SP = (1   n)(1   r); religious poor,
RP = (1  n)r; secular rich, SR = n(1  r); and religious rich, RR = nr: To limit the number
of cases to be considered, we assume:
Assumption 5 : Let 1=3 < n < 1=2 < r and 2r(1  n) < 1 < r(1 + n):
Thus no group constitutes a majority on its own, but the total of all religious agents, as
well as that of poor agents, do. Furthermore, the di¤erent groups can be ranked in size as
follows:39
SR < SP < SR+ SP < RR < RP < 1=2 < 1  n < r: (25)
By Assumption 4, the SR always desire  = 0 in the second subperiod, whereas the SP
want to set  > 0: In fact the rich, whether secular or religious, always have zero demand
for public spending on T; as its value  is less than the tax price H they face. We can thus
equivalently interpret T as pure transfers, to which only the poor (secular or religious) attach
a positive net value.
6.1 The Political Process
At both t and t + 1 there are now four groups vying for power, and furthermore the policy
space in the latter period is two-dimensional (level and nature of public spending). Standard
majority voting is thus not applicable. Instead, in each period political competition takes place
at the ballot box or as open conictaccording to the following sequential game:
1. In each social group, a randomly chosen member is selected as leader. The four leaders
then simultaneously decide whether to make a bid for power, at no personal cost, or to
stay out. Their entry choices are fully strategic and forward-looking, both within and
across periods.40
2. Citizens independently choose which of current contenders for power to support e.g.,
whom to vote or ght for. Since no individual has a measurable impact on the overall
39The condition r(1+n) > 1; which means that SR+SP < RR; can be weakened to r > 1 n; in which case
n > 1=3 is no longer necessary. The stronger version used here simplies the analysis. Recall also that group
sizes may be seen as adjusted by relative strength (e.g., military force, political inuence of wealth, etc.).
40As there are neither personal entry costs nor private benets from holding power, simple coordination among
members su¢ ces to ensure that a single leader is chosen. We thus abstract from potential free-rider problems
within each group, in order to focus on conict and coalitions across groups.
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outcome each one just chooses, sincerely, his preferred candidate.41
3. If a leader gains support from more than half of the population, he wins (is victorious
in battle, elected, etc.). If not, a second round of competition takes place between the
two candidates who received the most support in the rst round; the one who receives
support from a majority of citizens wins.
4. The victorious leader implements the policy that maximizes his own utility: as in the
citizen-candidate models on which we build (Osborne and Slivinsky (1996), Besley and
Coate (1997)), there is no way for politicians to credibly commit ex ante to following
a given course of action once in power. Importantly, the leaders choices coincide here
exactly with what his core constituency (socioreligious group of origin) wants him to do:
their interests and his, summarized by b and ; are aligned at both t and t+ 1:42
As before, in any even period t the government in power only chooses a blocking policy
t 2 f0; 1g and the implied level of taxes  t = R 1 (t' (at)) ; while in any odd period t+1 the
(possibly di¤erent) government holding o¢ ce chooses the nature and level of public spending,
together with the required taxes:





Equilibrium concept. With four groups, none of which constitutes a majority, coalitions
will need to form in order to gain power. Because citizen-candidate-type models typically
feature multiple Nash equilibria in which di¤erent coalitions arise to support di¤erent entry
proles, we impose a stronger requirement. We thus look, in the two-period (t and t+ 1) stage
game played by each generation, for a pure-strategy Perfectly Coalition-Proof Nash equilibrium
(PCPNE, Bernheim et al. (1987)). Unlike the standard Nash concept, CPNE for normal-form
games takes into account joint deviations by coalitions; however, only self-enforcing deviations
are considered to be credible threats.43 In extensive-form games, the additional subgame-
perfection requirement further restricts admissible coalitional agreements and deviations to be
dynamically consistent.
41When the members of a group are indi¤erent between several candidates, they split their support equally.
The assumptions of sincere voting (or allegiance) and a runo¤ stage (described below) are similar to those in
Osborne and Slivinsky (1996).
42At date t; the leader clearly has the same information on the empirical (in)adequacy of religious dogma as
his own constituency, and the same preferences. This remains true for the leader at t+ 1; because when a BR
innovation is blocked by the states repressive apparatus, no citizen, including the leader, learns of it. There is
also no asymmetry of beliefs between groups and their leader in any other state of the world. It would be easy
to allow for o¢ ce rents, in which case religiously-backed leadersincentive to block would be even greater.
43The denition is recursive: a deviation by n players is self-enforcing if no subcoalition of size n0 < n has a
strict incentive to initiate a new deviation from it that is itself self-enforcing.
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6.2 Equilibrium Fiscal Policy (Second Subperiod)
Given state variables (a; b) at t+ 1; we rst characterize the preferred scal policies of each of
the four groups, then the scal-policy outcome that emerges from their competition.
Consider rst the poor. Normalizing incomes by a, the secular poor maximize (1  )L +
R() over  2 [0; ^ ], so the rst-order condition yields  = (=L) for all   L: Similarly,
the religious poor maximize (1  )L +  [R() G] + bG over  2 [0; ^ ] and G  R(). The
linearity in G implies that G = 0 for b <  and G = R() for b  ; the optimization on 
yields  = (=L) in the rst case and  = (b=L) in the second. Hence:
Lemma 2 (1) The ideal policy of the secular poor is ( ; T;G) = (L(); R(L()); 0); where
L()  (=L) is increasing in =L.
(2) The ideal policy of the religious poor is the same as that of the secular poor if b < . If
b   it is ( ; T;G) = (L(b); 0; R(L(b))), where L(b)  (b=L) is increasing in b=L.
Consider next the rich. Secular ones maximize (1   )H + R() over  2 [0; ^ ]. Since
 < H and R0() < 1,  = 0 is clearly optimal. As to religious ones, they maximize (1  
)H +  [R() G] + bG over  2 [0; ^ ] and G  R(): If b < H , then  = 0 is again optimal.
If b > H > ; then G = R() is optimal and maximization yields  = (b=H):
Lemma 3 (1) The ideal policy of the secular rich is ( ; T;G) = (0; 0; 0).
(2) The ideal policy of the religious rich is the same if b < H : If b  H it is ( ; T;G) =
(H(b); 0; R(H(b))), where H(b)  (b=H) < L(b) is increasing in b=H :
We now examine when the religious poor prefer to side with the secular poor or with the
religious rich. When in power, the former provide a lot of T and no G; the latter no T and
a positive G; but (due to their distaste for taxes) at a level less than what the religious poor
desire. Naturally, the rst policy is preferred when beliefs b; which are complements to G; are
relatively low compared to the value  attached by poor agents to secular spending.
Lemma 4 (1) For any  there exists a unique b(; H ; L) > H > , or b() for short, such
that the religious poor prefer the ideal policy of the secular poor (dened by L()) to that of
the religious rich (dened by H(b)) if and only if b  b():
(2) The function b is strictly decreasing in L and strictly increasing in H .
(3) The function b is strictly increasing in .
Using these key properties of the di¤erent groupspreferences, we prove (in appendix) the
existence and uniqueness of a CPNE in the political subgame of period t+ 1:
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Figure 10: e¤ects of greater income inequality on the equilibrium tax rate
Proposition 5 The equilibrium scal policy in the second period is unique:
(1) If b < b(), either the secular poor come to power and implement their preferred policy
( ; T;G) = (L(); R(L()); 0), or the religious poor do and implement that same policy.44
(2) If b  b(), the religious rich come to power and implement their preferred policy,
( ; T;G) = (H(b); 0; R(H(b))).
Religion as a wedge issue. The equilibrium tax rate is illustrated in Figure 10. In
countries with low religiosity, secular governments come to power and implement welfare-state-
like policies that (mostly) benet the poor. Such countries tax more and have a larger public
sector than somewhat more religious ones, which provide not only a di¤erent set of public
goods but also at a lower level. In those latter countries, such as the United States, religion
splits the standard pro-redistribution coalition of the poor; the decisive class is then not only
more religious, but also richer. This result closely echoes that in Roemer (1998), although the
political mechanism involved is quite di¤erent.45
E¤ects of rising income inequality. The above results also imply (see again the gure) that
greater income inequality leads to the usual e¤ect of higher taxes and government spending in
low-religiosity countries such as those of Western Europe, but to lower levels of both (as well
as a di¤erent mix of public goods) in more religious countries, such as the United States.
44 In this rst case there may be (for b < ) two equilibria in terms of political-entry decisions, but since
both yield the same outcome this multiplicity is inconsequential. Without loss of generality, we can for instance
select the one with the secular poor in power. Indeed, this seems more natural, as it is their policy that is
implemented in all cases, and it is also the unique equilibrium for b <  < b().
45 In Roemers model of intra-party competition (with two parties), strong enough religious preferences in
the population force the otherwise pro-redistribution Labourparty to adopt a biding electoral platform that
caters to voters with (close to) median religious preferences. If median-religiosity voters have above-average
wealth, this means that even Labour will commit to a low tax rate. In our case there are four parties, no
credible commitment, and the median-religiosity voter is poor rather than rich (as income is uncorrelated with
religiosity). High religiosity leads the religious poor to support the religious rich, who gain power as a result.
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6.3 Equilibrium Policy of the Church
The Churchs behavior is similar to that in Section 5.2, except that it takes into account that
allowing religious beliefs to erode below b() will now lead to a drastic reallocation of power
towards secular (poor) agents. The latter will then cut G not only in relation to the decline
in b, but all the way to zero. Formally, the decision to repair the doctrine is still given by (9)
with  (b; ) dened in (8), but the provision of religious public goods is now
G (b; ) 

0 if b < b ()
R (H (b)) if b  b () (26)
rather than (7), by Proposition 5. The properties of the return-to-repairing function  (b; )
also remain unchanged from those in Lemma 1, except that b() replaces  and H (b) replaces
(b); as depicted in Figure 11; the formal statement and proof are given in Appendix 8.6. The
set of bs where  (b; )  y is thus again an interval [b (; y); b+(; y)]:
Let us now examine how (small or moderate) changes in the income distribution a¤ect the
Churchs incentive to undertake doctrinal repair and adaptation. In the notation, we make
explicit the dependence of  (via H (b) and b ()) on L and H :
Lemma 5 (1) As L rises, the graph of  (b; ; L; H) shifts (weakly) to the left, so that
b (; y) and b+(; y) both (weakly) decrease.
(2) As H rises, the graph of  (b; ; L; H) shifts (weakly) to the right, so that b (; y) and
b+(; y) both (weakly) increase.
These properties are illustrated in Figure 11 by the shift from solid to dashed lines. Re-
calling that the Church repairs when   =q; the relevant analogue of Assumption 2 is now:
Assumption 6 : R (H(b()=(1  )))  (1  )R (H(b())) < =q < R(^):
With the above properties of ; it leads to the following set of results, which not only
characterize the optimal behavior of the Church (thus generalizing Proposition 2) but also
describe how it responds to income inequality.
Proposition 6 (1) There exist a unique b and b, with




such that the Church attempts repair of a belief-eroding innovation (not blocked by the govern-





(2) Both b and b are increasing in H and weakly decreasing in L, hence strictly increasing
with income inequality (a marginal or moderate mean-preserving change in ):
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Figure 11: e¤ects of increasing inequality on Churchs repairing policy
The novel results are those concerning inequality, which are quite intuitive. At b; power
reallocation is not an issue: the RR will be in power at t + 1 no matter what, but if their
faith erodes, will provide a lower level of Gt+1: As they become relatively richer and thus face
a higher tax price for G this e¤ect is amplied, so the Church, which cares about bt+1Gt+1;
has a greater incentive to preserve bt+1: At b; on the other hand, repairing or not determines
whether the RR or the SP come to power at t+ 1: The SP always set G = 0; while the level
provided by the RR declines with their relative income, reducing the Churchs incentive to
preserve bt+1 in order to ensure their victory.
6.4 States Policy Toward Science (First Subperiod)
The only decision of the government in place at date t is the choice of a science policy 
tolerating or blocking BR innovations. While the aggregate costs of blocking are the same as
before (lower consumption at t to nance the repressive apparatus and foregone TFP gains at
t + 1), their incidence is di¤erent for rich and poor. As to the benets, they now di¤er not
only between secular and religious but also by income, since an erosion of beliefs can trigger a
reallocation of political power from (religious) rich to (secular) poor agents at t+ 1:
We start with some intuitive points, formally proved in Appendix 8.8. First, the SP are
always against blocking. Not only does a BR innovation raise productivity, but the erosion of
beliefs it generates is always benecial for them, for two reasons: (i) it reduces taxation and
spending on the religious public good G (which they do not care about) if the RR are in power
at t+ 1; namely if bt+1 remains above b(); (ii) it (weakly) increases the chance that the SP
themselves will gain power at t+ 1; which occurs if bt+1 falls below b():
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We impose in this section an additional simplifying assumption, which will ensure that the
SR also never want to block.
Assumption 7 : (1 + ) [1  L ()]  1  H(b()):
In words, the productivity gains from implementing new (BR) discoveries are large enough
that, even if the erosion of beliefs brings the secular poor to power, aftertax incomes at t+ 1
are higher than if blocking had occurred and the (lower-taxing) religious rich held power as a
result. A simple su¢ cient condition for this to be the case is (1 + ) [1  L ()]  1:
Next, as in the absence of income heterogeneity, there are two regions in which even a
religious government never engages in blocking. First, when b < b () the SP will always
be in power at t + 1 and set Gt+1 = 0; so there is no point for anyone to invest in blocking.
Second, when b 2 b;b, the Church will attempt to repair unblocked BR discoveries. Provided
it is su¢ ciently likely to succeed (Assumption 3), any rst-period government disliking such
innovations will let repair be attempted rather than make its own costly investment in blocking.
Our analysis below therefore concentrates on the two remaining no-repairing regions, b > b
and b ()  b < b; in which we characterize the ideal blocking policy of the RR (who, as we
shall see, always end up being pivotal at date t). Those of the RP and SR classes are then be
obtained through simple parameter substitutions.
6.4.1 Region 1: b > b > b()= (1  ). No repairing nor power reallocation
Since (1  ) b  b(); the religious rich will be in power at t+ 1 even if beliefs are eroded by
a new discovery. Their expected value at date t of setting up a blocking apparatus is therefore
V BRR(a; b) =

1 R 1 (' (a)) H + [1  + pR +  (1  pR) (1 + )]VRR (RRjb) ; (28)
where, for all b; VRR (RRjb)  [1   H (b)]H + bR (H (b)) represents their utility in old age.
As to their expected value of not blocking, it is
V NBRR = H + [1  +  (1  pR) (1 + )]VRR (RRjb) + pR (1 + )VRR(RRjb0); (29)
where b0  (1  ) b: The RRs blocking condition, V NBRR  V BRR; thus takes the form
R 1 (' (a)) H  pR[VRR (RRjb)  (1 + )VRR(RRjb0)]  1RR (b) : (30)
Substituting in old-age utilities, the right-hand side can be rewritten as
1RR (b) = pR

[1  H (b)] H + bR (H (b))  (1 + )






6.4.2 Region 2: b()  b <b< b()= (1  ) : No Repairing, Power Reallocation
The RR hold power at t+ 1 if beliefs remain intact, while the SP take over if a BR innovation
occurs and is not blocked, as there is no repairing in this range. Replacing VRR(RRjb0) in
(29)-(30) by VRR (SP )  [1  L ()]H + R (L ()) ; the blocking condition becomes
R 1 (' (a)) H  pR fVRR (RRjb)  (1 + )VRR (SP )g  2RR(b); (32)
where the right-hand side can be rewritten as
2RR (b) = pR f[1  H (b)]H + bR (H (b))  (1 + ) [(1  L ()) H + R (L ())]g : (33)
6.4.3 Equilibrium Blocking Policy
The blocking preferences of the religious poor are obtained, in each region, by simply replacing
H with L; those of secular agents by similarly replacing bR(H(b)) and bR(H(b)) with zero.
The resulting analogues to (31) and (33) are given in Appendix 8.8 (Lemma 9)). By studying
and comparing the four groupsblocking loci, we then show that their relative rankings remain
invariant throughout the state space:
(i) Whenever the RR block, then so do the RP:
(ii) The SR never want to block, as is the case for the SP:
These properties imply that the RR are always pivotal in the date-t political competition
that determines science policy. Intuitively, when they are against blocking the SP and the SR
agree with them, resulting in an absolute majority by (25). When the RR do want to block,
the RP agree with them, again adding up to an absolute majority. Formally, we prove the
following results, illustrated by the solid lines in Figure 12.
Proposition 7 The unique Perfectly Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium (PCPNE) of the two-
period game always implements the preferred science policy of the religious rich. The corre-
sponding blocking boundary is an upward-sloping line b = B(a) in the state space.
6.4.4 Income Inequality and Science Policy
Keeping the sizes (n; 1   n) of the rich and poor classes constant, consider a relatively small
mean-preserving change in their income levels: (dH ; dL); with ndH + (1   n)dL = 0: We
assume that, initially, there is already a certain degree of inequality in society (recall that
average income is normalized to 1) :










Figure 12: e¤ects of higher inequality on science-blocking policy
We now examine the impact of distributional changes of the RRs blocking policy.
Proposition 8 A marginal increase in income inequality (mean-preserving spread) causes the
equilibrium blocking locus to:
1. Shift up in the high-religiosity region b > b; where there is neither repairing nor power
reallocation.
2. Shift down in the moderate-religiosity region b ()  b < b where there is no repairing
and BR discoveries potentially trigger a reallocation of power toward the secular poor.
3. These shifts lead, ceteris paribus (i.e. if there is no simultaneous change in the Churchs
repairing behavior), to less blocking in the rst case and more the second.
Figure 12 illustrates, through the shift from solid to dashed lines, the combined e¤ects of
an increase in income inequality on science policy by the state, repairing by the Church and
public spending, leading in turn lead to Proposition 9 below.
(i) The second-period scal-policy threshold b () shifts up. When their income rises, the
RR face a higher tax price for provision of the religious public good G and consequently want
to reduce its supply. The RP; on the other hand, want to increase redistributive transfers,
T: For the RP to still prefer allying themselves with the RR rather than the SP therefore
requires a higher level of religiosity; their indi¤erence threshold b () thus increases.
(ii) The Churchs repairing region shifts up. The lower demand for G by the RR as they
become relatively richer gives the Church, which cares about bt+1Gt+1; a greater incentive to
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preserve beliefs near b (where the RR will be in power no matter what), but a lower one near
b; where the purpose of repairing is to prevent the SP from gaining power and setting G = 0:
(iii) The States blocking locus B(a) shifts upwards at high levels of religiosity ( b > b) and
downward at low levels of b ( b < b). Blocking is most costly to the rich as they must forego
more income, but it can also prevent a shift of power to the SP at t+1:When the RR become
richer, the rst e¤ect dominates at high levels of b; as even with eroded beliefs the RP will
not switch allegiance (Region 1). The second e¤ect prevails when religiosity is intermediate,
as power is now at stake if beliefs come to be eroded (Region 2).
Proposition 9 In the Americanregime, corresponding to intermediate values of b=a; greater
income inequality leads to more blocking of threatening scientic ndings, and to (weakly)
greater doctrinal rigidity (less adaptation) of the religious sector. At high enough levels of
religiosity, corresponding to theocratic regimes, it has the opposite (Arab Spring) e¤ects.
While the underlying details are somewhat involved (each potential coalition at t must
envision all possible coalitions at t + 1 that its actions can empower or defeat), the main
intuition for how increased inequality leads to the emergence of a religious-right alliance in (the
appropriate region of) the Americanregime is simple. When it comes to choices over scal
policy and public spending (date t+ 1); if the RP s faith has eroded they will ally themselves
with the SP and implement a high level of redistribution clearly the worst possible outcome
for the RR: If they remain su¢ ciently pious, on the other hand, they will support instead
the RRs compromisepolicy of moderate taxes but religion-favoring spending, which then
wins. Looking forward at date t; the RR realize that in order to hold power at date t + 1
they must preserve the religiosity of the RP; which may require blocking certain economically
valuable innovations. When the stakes of who will control taxes and spending at t+ 1 are high
enough (i.e., when there is a lot of inequality), this concern dominates over the fact that rich
agents benet most from productivity gains. Consequently, the RR strategically give priority
to religion over science at date t; and in so doing they have the support of the RP; who are
always those with the greatest incentive to block. The dynamic outcome is that the RR gain
power at date t, and thanks to blocking they keep it at date t+ 1:
7 Concluding Comments
Several extensions of our framework can be envisioned. Besides being a source utility for some
agents, religiosity could also have a direct e¤ect on growth, e.g. by promoting greater trust
and trustworthiness among individuals (at least, up to the point where it becomes a source of
civil strife), or by legitimizing the authority of the ruler and state, thereby reducing agency
problems. The key tradeo¤ with allowing belief-eroding ideas to di¤use would then remain,
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and a hill-shaped relationship between religiosity and growth would likely emerge. Interstate
conict o¤ers another interesting direction for research: an intensely religious population and
strong state-church links are valuable assets in the short to medium run (increasing peoples
willingness to ght and die for the cause), but in the long run the associated drag on scientic
knowledge and technological innovation leads to military backwardness as was the case for
the Ottoman Empire.
The leading examples of forbidden fruitsdiscussed in the paper involved the hard sciences
on the one hand, religion stricto sensu (belief in deities and spirits, creation, afterlife, etc.) on
the other. It should be clear from the model, however, that both concepts should be taken in
a much more general sense. Two concrete cases perhaps best demonstrate this point.
The rst is that of Lysenkoism in the Soviet Union between 1935 and 1964. During three
decades, Inquisition-like methods (forced denunciations, imprisonments, executions) were used
to repress bourgeoisscientic knowledge and methodology in evolutionary biology and agron-
omy, with adverse spillovers onto many other areas. Meanwhile, the Stalinist regime also pro-
moted and enforced a pseudoscience which it saw as more compatible with its dogma of Mans
and societys malleability to rapid social change.
The second case is modern contraception, a very applied innovation though directly derived
from fundamental advances in human biology. Here again we nd the four key characteristics
of BR innovations in our model: (i) a large positive impact on long-term productivity, by
allowing greater participation of women in the labor force and increasing their return to human
capital investment; (ii) a conict with several of the worlds major religious doctrines and their
teachings about the divinely ordered role of women, purpose of sexuality and sacrality of the
body; (iii) as a result, its condemnation by religious authorities and initial proscription by the
state; (iv) over time (and not in all places), as society becomes more secular or/and religious
doctrine is modernized, the innovation is allowed to di¤use, a¤ecting both productivity and
mentalities.
Many other examples could be drawn from medicine or the social sciences. As much
as individual discoveries and ideas, it is to a large extent the scientic method itself, with its
emphasis on systematic doubt, contradictory debate and empirical falsiability, that inevitably
runs afoul of preestablished dogmas. The model could also be used to study the interactions
between many types of new ideas (scientic, social, political) and vested beliefs (religious,
cultural, ideological, corporate), leading to the emergence of stable regimes where either form
of reasoning and knowinggains primacy, or the two manage to coadapt. On the empirical
side, the robust inverse relationship between religiosity and innovation uncovered by our simple
analysis, across both countries and US states, surely deserves further investigation. Work in
this direction will include nding plausible instruments to assess both directions of causality
(as emphasized in the model), individual-level analyses, and perhaps even experiments.
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8 Proofs Appendix
8.1 Proof of Lemma 1
(1) For b < , G (b; ) = G ((1  ) b; ) = 0; hence  (b; ) = 0: For   b < =(1   ), the
religious switch to the provision of the secular public good when religiosity is eroded from b to
b0  (1   )b: Therefore, over this range  (b; ) = R ((b)), which is strictly increasing and
continuous in b; at b = , the function  (b; ) thus has an upward jump of R (()).
(2) For =(1  )  b, the religious provide G even when b falls to (1  ) b; so
 (b; ) = R ((b))  (1  )R (((1  ) b)) : (A.1)
From the rst-order condition bR0 ((b)) = 1 follows that
0(b) =
1
 b2R00((b)) > 0; so (A.2)
@ (b; )
@b











This expression is negative if  R0()=R00() is decreasing (as (b) is increasing), which is
implied by Assumption 1. The function  (b; ) in (A.1) is therefore decreasing on [=(1  
);+1); at b = =(1  ) it has a downward jump of   (1  )R (()). As b tends to +1,
nally, both (b) and ((1  ) b) tend to ^ , so by (A.1)  (b; ) tends to R(^) > 0: 
8.2 Proof of No Blocking When Repairing, i.e. When b 2 [b;b]
(1) When b 2 [= (1  ) ;b], the Churchs attempt of repairing BR innovations is successful
with probability q, and in this case beliefs and the level of the religious public good provided is
unchanged. With probability 1  q repairing fails, the level of religious beliefs drops to b0  ,
which implies that the amount of religious public good is still provided but at a lower level.
Therefore, the value of not blocking in this case is





where V (b0) is given by (11). Combining (A.4) and (12), the blocking condition V NB < V B
can be written as
R 1 (' (a))  pR

[1  q (1 + )]V (b)  (1  q) (1 + )V  b0	  3I (b) : (A.5)
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(2) When b 2 [b; =(1   )) and repair fails, religiosity falls to b0 < , so Gt+1 = 0 and the
value of not blocking becomes
V NB = 1 + [1  +  (1  pR) (1 + ) + pRq (1 + )]V (b) +pR(1  q) (1 + )V () ; (A.6)
which is equivalent to (A.4) with V () replacing V (b0). Hence, the blocking condition becomes
R 1 (' (a))  pR f[1  q (1 + )]V (b)  (1  q) (1 + )V ()g  3II (b) : (A.7)
Lemma 6 There exists a q = q < 1= (1 + ) such that, for any q > q, the religious majority




: Consequently, under Assumption
3, the State does not block in this region.
Proof. Consider (A.5) and note that 3I (b) < 0 for all q  1= (1 + ) : Moreover V (b)
is increasing in b; so @3I (b) =@q =  pR (1 + ) [V (b)  V (b0)] < 0: Hence, there exists
a qI < 1= (1 + ) such that 
3I (b) has the sign of qI   q: Similarly, (A.7) implies, for all
b > ; @3I (b) =@q =  pR (1 + ) [V (b)  V ()] < 0; so there exists a qII < 1= (1 + ) such
that 3II (b) has the sign of qII   q: Under Assumption 3, q > max fqI ; qIIg  q; so there is
no blocking for b 2 b; b : 
8.3 Proof that i (b), i = 1; 2, Is Increasing in b
Di¤erentiating (15) and using the envelope theorem (note that 1 (b) is the di¤erence between





R ((b))  (1 + ) (1  )R  (b0) : (A.8)
Any blocking of BR innovations requires that 1 (b)  0; which by (15) takes the form
R ((b))  (1 + ) (1  )R  (b0)  (1=b) (1 + )  1  (b0)  (1  (b)) : (A.9)
Since (b) is nondecreasing and b0  (1  ) b; the right-hand side of (A.9) is strictly positive.
Therefore, 1 (b)  0 implies that @1 (b) =@b > 0 in (A.8). Similarly, from (18) we obtain
@2 (b) =@b = pRR (
(b)) ; which is always positive.
8.4 Proof of Lemma 4
(1) The utility of the religious poor under the ideal policy of the religious rich is
f (b)  [1  H (b)] L + bR (H (b)) for b  H ; f(b)  L otherwise, (A.10)
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whereas under that of the secular poor it equals
g ()  [1  L ()] L + R (L ()) : (A.11)
For b  H , f(b) < g(). For b  H , f(b) is an increasing function, since
f 0 (b) = R (H (b)) +

bR0 (H (b))  L

 0H (b) = R (H (b)) + [H   L]  0H (b) > 0:
Finally, as b tends to +1, H (b) = (b=H) tends to ^ , so f(b) tends to +1: This shows the
existence of a unique indi¤erence point, b() > H > : To determine its comparative-statics,
we rst prove two simple properties linking the preferred tax rates of poor and rich agents.
Lemma 7 For any  2 (L; H); let ~b ()   (H=L) > H : Then L () = H(~b ()) >
H (b
 ()) :
Proof. The equality follows from L() = (=L) and H(b) = (b=H) for b  H : The
inequality then holds if ~b () > b () or, by monotonicity of f; f(~b()) > f(b()): We have
f(~b()) = [1  H(~b())]L + ~b()R(H(~b())) = [1  L ()] L + ~b()R (L ())
> [1  L ()] L + R (L ()) = g()  f(b());
using the denition of b(); hence the result. k
(2) Making the dependence of f and g on (L; H) explicit, we have
@f (b; L; H)
@L
= 1  H (b) ;
@g (; L)
@L
= 1  L () +
 L + R0 (L ()) @L (b)
@L
= 1  L () ;
by the rst-order condition of the SP . Therefore,
@f (b; L; H)
@L
  @g (; L)
@L
= L ()  H (b) ;
which is always positive at b = b since H (b ()) < L () ; by Lemma 7.(2) above. Since
f(b)  g () is also increasing in b, its unique zero, b(); is therefore strictly decreasing in L:
Similarly, @b=@H > 0 follows from the fact that
@f (b; L; H)
@H
  @g (; L)
@H
=
 L + bR0 (H (b)) @H (b)
@H











(3) Recall that b () is uniquely dened by the indi¤erence condition
[1  H (b ())] L + b ()R (H (b ())) = [1  L()] L + R (L()) : (A.13)
Di¤erentiation with respect to  yields
b0 () =
R (L())
(H   L)  0H (b ()) +R (H (b ()))
; (A.14)
where we have used the rst-order condition of the SP , R0 (L ()) = L, and the rst-order
condition of the RR at b = b (), b ()R0 (H (b ())) = H . From the rst-order condition
of the RR dening H (b) ; it also follows that
 0H (b) =
H
 b2R00(H (b)) > 0; (A.15)
and therefore that b0 () > 0: 
8.5 Proof of Proposition 5
A - Region  < b < b()
Case 1: H  b < b():46 In this case, the optimal tax rate of the RR is H(b) > 0: This
implies that the SP strictly prefer the SR to the RR, and the RP strictly prefer the RR to
the SR. The Table 1 displays the rankings of each group i over the ideal scal policies of the
four groups j ; naturally, its own policy is always ranked rst.
SP RP RR SR
SP 1 4 3 2
RP 2 1 3 4
RR x y 1 z
SR x0 4 y0 1
where (x; y; z) = (3; 4; 2) [subcase (a)], or (4; 2; 3) or (4; 3; 2) [subcase b]; (x0; y0) = (2; 3) or (3; 2):
Table 1. Fiscal preferences of each group when H  b < b()
46We use the weak inequality H  b because in Lemma 2 we are breaking the indi¤erence at b = H in favor
of the RR providing the religious public good.
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The rst two rows are self-explanatory. In the third, subcase (a) refers to the situation
where the RR prefer the SP to the RP (they will then also prefer the SR to the SP ), whereas
in subcase (b) they prefer the RP to the SP ; we then do not know a priori how the SR are
ranked relative to the RP . The last row of Table 1 shows that for the SRs least preferred
policy is that of the RP; and that they may rank that of the SP ahead of that of the RR; or
vice versa.
We now show that the SP winning implementing their preferred scal policy in the
second period of the political game (a generations old age) is a CPNE outcome (Claim 1),
and then that this equilibrium is unique (see Claims 24).
Claim 1: The SP winning at t+ 1 is a CPNE outcome.
Proof: Consider the case where only the SP and the RR candidates enter in the context, so
that the strategy prole is (SP = E;RP = N;RR = E;SR = N) where E and N denote
respectively the entry and non-entry of the candidate. The SP are the winner, as they get the
support of the RP and the poor are the majority in the population. It is immediate that this
is a Nash Equilibrium (NE) as no player has an incentive to deviate; we next show that there
is no self-enforcing coalitional deviation.
Note rst that any winning deviating coalition must contain the RP and that the SP
are the 2nd choice for the RP . The coalition (RP;RR) get (2; x) when the SP wins. The
only available vector that could Pareto-dominate (2; x) is (1; y); achieved in subcase (b) by
(RP = E;RR = N), with the RP winning, since (x; y; z) 2 f(4; 2; 3); (4; 3; 2)g: But this
coalition is not self-enforcing. If the RR stays in, no one gets the absolute majority in the
rst round (where there are at least three candidates SP , RP and RR). By condition (25),
the SP (and eventually the SR) drops out, and the RR wins against the RP in the second
round, so it is optimal for the RR to deviate by playing E rather than N . This shows that
the only possible coalitional deviation is not self-enforcing, and therefore that the NE with the
SP winning is coalition-proof.
Claim 2: The RR winning (implementing their preferred policy) at t + 1 cannot be a
CPNE outcome.
Proof: Assume that there is a NE with the RR winning. Then, it cannot be coalition-proof.
Let us consider the deviation (SP = E;RP = N). The SP wins with the support of the
RP and this deviation is protable as (1; 2) < (3; 3); see Table 1.47 The deviation is also
self-enforcing, so that a NE with the RR winning cannot be coalition-proof. In fact, if the
RP deviates and stays in, there will be at least three candidates in the rst round and no one
getting the absolute majority. By condition (25), the SP (and eventually the SR) drops out,
47The decisions of the SR in terms of entry/non-entry and whom to support are irrelevant in this case.
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and the RR wins in the second round against the RP . The RP get their 3rd rather than 2nd
choice, which means that they have no incentive to deviate.
Claim 3: The RP winning at t+ 1 cannot be a CPNE outcome.
Proof: Again, assume there is a NE with the RP winning. The deviation (SP = N;RR = E)
brings the RR to power48 and is protable as (3; 1) < (4; y) (since y  2). This deviation is
also self-enforcing. If the SP deviates and stays in, there will be at least three candidates in
the rst round. By condition (25), the RR and the RP go to the second round where the RR
will win anyway.
Claim 4: The SR winning at t+ 1 cannot be a CPNE outcome.
Proof: We again show that if there is a NE with the SR winning, it cannot be coalition-proof.
Subcase (a). The deviation (SP = E;RP = N) leads the SP to power (supported by the
RP ) and it is protable, since (1; 2) < (2; 4): To establish that it is also self-enforcing, note
in Table 1 that, since y = 4; the RP are ranked last by every other group and consequently
can never win (in either round). Therefore it is not protable for them to deviate and enter
against the SP ; conversely it is not optimal for the SP to let them enter alone.
Subcase (b). A protable deviation is (RP = N;RR = E); since it brings the RR to power,
and (3; 1) < (4; z); as z  2: The deviation is also self-enforcing: if the RP deviate from it, the
SP (and eventually the SR) candidate drops out in round 1 by (25), and the RR wins anyway
against the RP in round 2.
Case 2:  < b < H : The preference structure, reported in Table 2, di¤ers from the previous
one because the RR and the SR now have the same ideal policy (zero tax rate). This implies
that the SP and the RP are both indi¤erent between the RR and the SR. Moreover, the SR
will always rank the RR0s policy 2nd, and vice-versa. It is easily veried that the analysis of
Case 1 applies here as well (with now only subcase (a) relevant in Claim 4).
SP RP RR SR
SP 1 3 2 2
RP 2 1 3 3
RR x y 1 2
SR 3 4 2 1
where (x; y) = (3; 4) [subcase (a)], or (4; 3) [subcase (b)].
Table 2. Fiscal preferences of each group when  < b < H
48When the SR do not enter, all groups but the RP support the RR; who win in round 1. When SR = E
and the sum of RR and SP is less than 50%, the RR and the RP go to round 2, and the RR wins.
46
B - Region b() < b: Table 3 reports the preference structure for this case.
SP RP RR SR
SP 1 4 3 2
RP 3 1 2 4
RR x y 1 z
SR x0 4 y0 1
where (x; y; z) = (3; 4; 2) [subcase (a)], or (4; 2; 3) or (4; 3; 2) [subcase (b)]; (x0; y0) = (2; 3) or (3; 2):
Table 3. Fiscal preferences of each group when b() < b
Claim 1: The RR winning at t+ 1 is the unique Nash equilibrium outcome.
Proof: We show that if the RR enter, they always win, independently of all other groups
strategies; the result will immediately follows. Let the RR enter (either on or o¤the equilibrium
path), and suppose rst that RP stay out. They then back the RR (whom they rank second),
who thus win in the rst round. If the RP do enter, there are two possible subcases:
(a) If neither the SP nor the SR enter, both support the RR (whom they always prefer to
the religious poor), who thus again win immediately.
(b) If either or both of these groups enter, no one has a majority in the rst round. The
RP and the RR; being the two largest contestants, make it to the second round and here again
win with the support of both the SP and the SR:
Claim 2: The RR winning at t+ 1 is a (unique) CPNE outcome.
Proof: Let the RR enter alone: (SP = N;RP = N;RR = E;SR = N): By Claim 1 no group
would gain from deviating, since the RR will win anyway. To show that it is coalition-proof,
note that the minimal winning coalition is (SP;RP ); who obtain (3; 2) when the RR win. As
there is no policy vector that Pareto-dominates (3; 2), there is no protable deviating coalition,
hence the result. Uniqueness follows from Claim 1.
C - Locus b = b(): The only di¤erence with the previous case is that the RP are now
indi¤erent between the SP and the RR : the preference structure is still given by Table 3,
except that the second row is now (2 1 2 4): The preceding reasoning remains unchanged
since, in cases (rst or second round) where the RP have a choice between RR and SP; it
is enough that they split their vote equally to ensure the latters victory: by Assumption 5
RR + RP=2 = r(1 + n)=2 > 1=2: The RR winning is thus again the only NE and CPNE
outcome.
D - Region b < : The SP and RP have the same preferred policy, so either on entering,
backed by the other, wins a majority. Moreover, the RR winning cannot be an CPNE outcome,
as that same majority of SP plus RP can deviate (e.g., (RP = E;SP = N)) and win. 
47
8.6 Churchs Repairing Policy with Income Heterogeneity
Lemma 8 (1) The function  (b; ) equals 0 for b < b(); then jumps up to  (b(); ) =
R (H (b
())) : It is continuous and strictly increasing on [b(); b()=(1   )); then jumps
down to  (b()=(1  ); ) = R (H (b()=(1  )))   (1  )R (H (b())) : Finally, it is
continuous and strictly decreasing on [b()=(1  );+1); with limb!+1  (b; ) = R(^) > 0:
Proof. The proof is the same as for Lemma 1, except that for b()=(1  )  b;
 (b; ) = R (H (b))  (1  )R (H ((1  ) b))  (b; H); (A.16)
@ (b; H)
@b











now replace (A.1) and (A.17) respectively, with  0H (b) given by (A.15). 
8.7 Proof of Lemma 5
(1) (i) The function  (b; ; L; H) depends on L only trough the cuto¤s b() and b()=(1 
) at which (b) jumps, respectively up from 0 to (R  H) (b()) and down from (R 
H)(b
()=(1   )) to (R  H)(b())  (R  H)((1   )b()); note that these four values
are independent of L. Consider now an increase in L to ~L 2 (L; H); by Lemma 4.(2),
the two cuto¤s b() and b()=(1   ) decrease, to values which we shall denote ~b() and
~b() =(1  ), with
~b() < b() < ~b() =(1  ) < b()=(1  )
provided the change in L is not too large. Moreover, by the property just noted, the new
function ~(b)  (b; ; ~L; H) coincides with the old (b)   (b; ; L; H) on [0;~b()), on
[b();~b() =(1   )] and on [b()=(1   );+1). They di¤er only on [~b(); b()), where
~(b) = R (H (b)) > 0 = (b) and on [~b() =(1  ); b()=(1  )), where ~(b) = R (H (b)) 
(1  )R (H ((1  ) b)) < R (H (b)) = (b):
(ii) Omitting the dependence on y to simplify the notation, let now b () and b+() denote
the two points where, by Property (1)(i) above, the graph of (b) intersects the horizontal
 = y (we shall denote b () = b() when  (b()) = R (H (b())) > y); let ~b () and ~b+()
similarly denote those intersections for the graph of ~ (with ~b () = ~b() when ~(~b()) =
R(H(~b
())) > y). By construction, b () lies in the range where (b) is increasing (including
the upward discontinuity), and by Property (1)(i) the graph of ~ is above that of  in that
range strictly when b 2 [~b(); b()). This implies that ~b () must lie to the left of b ().
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Similarly, ~b+() lies in the range where ~(b) is decreasing; by Property (1)(i), in that range
the graph of  is either above that ~ (for all b 2 [~b() =(1   ); b()=(1   ))) or equal to it
(for all b  b()=(1  )), so it must be that ~b+() lies to the left of b+().
(2) (i) To show that an increase in H shifts (weakly) the graph of  (; ; L; H) to the
right, note the following three features of this function.
First, over the range [b(); b()=(1   )), the function  (b; ; L; H) = R (H (b)) is
strictly increasing and continuous in b and is strictly decreasing in H as
@ (b; ; L; H)
@H




given that @H (b) =@H < 0 from (A.12).
Second, over the range [b()=(1  );+1), the function  (b; ; L; H) is given by (A.16),
it is decreasing and continuous in b and is strictly increasing in H . In fact,
@ (b; H)
@H
= R0 (H (b))
@H (b)
@H












where we have used (A.12) and b0  (1  )b. This expression is positive as H (b) is increasing
in b and Assumption 1 ensures that  R0()=R00() is decreasing in  .
Third, by Lemma 4.(2), the two cuto¤s b() and b()=(1   ) are increasing in H .
Therefore, if we consider an increase in H to ~H , the two cuto¤s b() and b()=(1   )
increase to values which we shall denote ~b() and ~b() =(1  ) with





provided the change in H is not too large. The above three properties of  (b; ; L; H) imply
that an increase in H shifts (weakly) to the right the graph of this function.
Summarizing, the new function ~(b)  (b; ; L; ~H) has the following graph. Over the
range [0; b()), it equals zero and coincides with the old (b)   (b; ; L; H) : Over the
range [b();~b()), (b) = R (H (b)) > 0 = ~(b), and (b) = R (H (b)) > R (~H (b)) = ~(b)
over [~b(); b()=(1  )), where ~H (b) denotes the optimal tax rate of the religious rich when
their income is ~H . The function ~(b) = R (~H (b)) is continuous and increasing over the range
[b()=(1  );~b() =(1  )), while the function (b) = R (H (b))  (1  )R (H ((1  ) b))
is decreasing over this range and has a downward jump at b()=(1  ). The function ~(b) =
R (~H (b)) (1  )R (~H ((1  ) b)) has a downward discontinuity at ~b() =(1 ), and it is de-
creasing over the range [~b() =(1 );+1) with ~(b) = R (~H (b)) (1  )R (~H ((1  ) b)) >
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(b) = R (H (b))  (1  )R (H ((1  ) b)) :
(ii) By construction, b () lies in the range where (b) is increasing (including the upward
discontinuity), i.e. b () 2 [b(); b()=(1   )), and by Property (2)(i) the graph of ~ is
below that of  on that range (strictly where  > 0). This implies that ~b () must lie to
the right of b (). Similarly, b+() lies in the range where (b) is decreasing, i.e. b+() 2
[b()=(1  );+1). By Property (i) above, on that range the graph of ~ is either increasing
or decreasing and above that . There will never be ~b+() in the range where ~ is increasing
but, eventually, only ~b () can be in this range. This means that ~b+() belongs to the range
where ~ is decreasing and above that , i.e. ~b+() 2 [~b() =(1 );+1), which in turn implies
that ~b+() lies to the right of b+(): 
8.8 Proof of Proposition 7
Given any values of the state variables at the start of date t+ 1; the ensuing Church decision
and political competition lead to the unique CPNE outcome described in Proposition 5. The
intertemporal expected utilities for each type of agent that will result under blocking and no
blocking thus dene the payo¤s of the date-t political game, which we now show also has a
unique CPNE outcome. Together with its unique continuation, it will therefore constitute the
unique PCPNE of generation ts two-period, three-stage game.
(1) We rst show, in Lemma 9 below, that: (i) the RR are always the pivotal group at
date-t they want to block (weakly) less than the RP; whereas neither the SP nor the SR
ever want to; (ii) for q  1=(1 + ); even the RP prefer not to block in the repairing region,
b 2 b; b :
Recall that the RR want to block, V NBRR  V BRR; if and only if (31) and (33) exceed
R 1('(a))H ; in Regions 1 and 2 respectively. We rst derive more general conditions for
all four types, then rank them.
If all BR innovations are blocked, the RR will be in power at t+ 1; so the expected utility
of any agent with income  2 [L; H ] and religiousness  2 f0; 1g is
[1 R 1('(a))] + [1  + (1  pR)(1 + )] [(1  H (b))  + bR (H (b))]: (A.19)
Suppose now that BR innovations are not blocked, but that their damage to beliefs gets
repaired with probability ~q 2 [0; 1]: While the optimal strategy of the Church implies ~q =
1fb2[b;b]g  q; for now we treat ~q as a parameter. There are two cases to consider.
Case I: b  b()=(1  ): The RR will be in power at t+1 even repair fails, so the expected
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utility of agents in group(; ) is now
 + [1  +  (1  pR(1  ~q)) (1 + )] [(1  H (b))  + bR (H (b))]













with b0  (1  )b: The group of (; )-types therefore wants to block if and only if
R 1('(a))  pRf[1  ~q (1 + )] [(1  H (b))  + bR (H (b))]
  (1  ~q) (1 + ) [(1  H (b0))  + b0R (H (b0))]g  I(b; ; ; ~q):
(A.21)
Case II: b 2 [b();b()=(1  )): When repair fails, it is now the SP who come to power
at t+ 1; implementing (T;G) = (R(L()); 0): The expected utility of any group (; ) is thus
obtained by simply replacing b0 by  and H(b0) by L() in (A.21). Its utility under blocking
is unchanged from (A.19), so the blocking condition is given by similar substitutions in (A.21):
R 1('(a)  pR [1  ~q (1 + )] (1  H (b))  + bR (H (b))
  (1  ~q) (1 + ) [(1  L ())  + R (L ())]  II(b; ; ; ; ~q):
(A.22)
Lemma 9 Let b  b(): Then:
1. For all b  b()=(1 ) where I(b; ; 1; ~q)  0; the function I(b; ; 1; ~q)= is strictly de-
creasing in : Similarly, for all b < b()=(1 ) where II(b; ; 1; ~q)  0; II(b; ; ; 1; ~q)=
is strictly decreasing in : Therefore, whenever the RR want to block, so do the RP:
2. For all b  b()=(1  ); I(b; ; 0; ~q) < 0; while for all b < b()=(1  ); Assumption
7 implies that II(b; ; H ; 0; ~q) < 0: In both cases, no secular agent wants to block.
3. For all q  1=(1 + ); I(b; ; ; q) < 0 and II(b; ; ; ; q) < 0: Therefore, under
Assumption 3, no group nds it optimal to block in the repairing region, b 2 [b;b]:
Proof. The last claim is immediate. For the other two, note that I(b; ; 1; ~q)=pR is a¢ ne
in ; of the form bAI +BI; where







BI  [1  ~q (1 + )] [1  H (b)]  (1  ~q) (1 + ) [1  H(b0)] < 0;
since H is weakly increasing and  > 0: By (A.21), a minimal condition for (; ) types to
want to block is I  0; which implies that bAI   BI > 0: For  = 0 (the secular) this
cannot be, while for  = 1 (the religious) this implies that I= = bAI= + BI is decreasing
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in : Similarly, II=pR is of the form AII() +BII; where
AII()    [1  ~q (1 + )] bR (H (b))  (1  ~q) (1 + ) R (L ()) ;
BII  [1  ~q (1 + )] [1  H (b)]  (1  ~q) (1 + ) [1  L ()] < 0:
Moreover, AII(0) < [1  ~q (1 + )] [1   H (b)]   (1   ~q) (1 + ) (1  L ())] by (A.22) and
b  b(); the rest of the proof proceeds as in the other case. k
Having thus proved Lemma 9, we now show formally that the only CPNE outcome always
involves implementing the preferred policy of RR:
(a) Consider rst the case where they want to block. Then so do the RP; whereas the
SP and SR never want to. At least one (or both) of RR or RP then nds optimal to enter:
indeed, if only one of them does it is supported by the other and thus wins in the rst round;
if both do and it leads to anything else than their common preferred outcome, i.e., blocking,
it is optimal for one of them to deviate and back the other. Thus, in any Nash equilibrium,
blocking must occur. Furthermore, the proles (SP = N;RP = N;RR = E;SR = N)
(SP = N;RP = E;RR = N;SR = N) are both CPNEs (with the same outcome): for a
deviation to be protable it would need to result in a di¤erent outcome, and this can occur
only if RR or RP or both deviate(s); they could only lose, however, and so never will.
(b) Suppose now that RR do not want to block. The RP is the only group that might
want to. They will never win, however, as it would be optimal for at least one the three groups
to enter, and beat the RP with the support of the other two. Thus, in any Nash equilibrium,
blocking cannot occur. Finally, it is easy to verify that (SP = N;RP = E;RR = N;SR = N)
is again a CPNE.
This concludes the proof of Part (1) of Proposition 7.
(2) In each Region k = 1; 2; the equilibrium blocking boundary is dened byR 1 (' (a)) H =
kRR (b) ; with the left-hand side increasing in a: We show i each case @
k
RR (b) =@b > 0; im-
plying that B(a)  (R kRR) 1 (' (a)) H is well-dened and increasing in a: Indeed, setting
















(b; ; H ; 1; ~q) = [1  ~q (1 + )]R (H (b)) > 0;
with AI > 0 whenever I(b; H ; 1; ~q)  0; as shown earlier. Setting ~q = 0 proves the desired
results. 
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8.9 Proof of Proposition 8
Region 1: b > b > b()=(1  ). No repairing and no power reallocation.
The blocking condition is here 1RR (b)  R 1 (' (a)) H  0; see (30). Di¤erentiating the
left-hand side with respect to H and using the envelope theorem yields
@1RR (b)
@H
 R 1 (' (a)) = pR






 R 1 (' (a)) < 0; (A.23)
since H (b0) < H (b) :
Region 2. b ()  b < b. No repairing, leading to a power reallocation.
The blocking condition is now 2RR (b) R 1 (' (a)) H  0; see (32). A similar di¤erenti-






1  H (b)  (1 + ) [1  L ()] + (1 + ) (H   L) @L ()
@H

 R 1 (' (a)) ;
Greater inequality thus leads to more blocking if






Since maxfH (b) ; L ()g < 1; a su¢ cient condition for (A.24) to hold is




pR (1 + )
: (A.25)
Di¤erentiating implicitly the rst order condition of the SP , R0 (L ()) = L, with respect









 [ R00 (L ())] > 0: (A.26)
Substituting (A.26) into (A.25), the latter can be rewritten as




 R00 (L ())1 + R 1 (' (a))
pR (1 + )

: (A.27)
SinceR (L ()) is C3 andR00 (L ()) is nonincreasing (by Assumption 1, R000  0),  R00 (L ())
is positive, nondecreasing and bounded from above by  R00 (^), while ' (a) has an upper bound
at ': Therefore, condition (A.27) holds under Assumption 8. In this region, greater income
inequality thus leads, ceteris paribus, to more blocking. 
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